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Competitive Philanthropy: Charitable Naming 
Rights, Inequality, and Social Norms 
LINDA SUGIN* 
Income inequality today is at a high not seen since the 1920s, and one 
way the very richest display their wealth is through charitable giving. 
Gifts in excess of $100 million are no longer rare, and in return for 
their mega-gifts, the biggest donors get their names on buildings, an 
astonishingly valuable benefit that the tax law ignores. The law makes 
no distinction between a gift of $100 and a gift of $100 million.  
 
This Article argues that the tax law of charity should focus on the very 
rich and harness the culture of philanthropy among the elite. The law 
should encourage and celebrate what this Article calls “competitive 
philanthropy,” which defines philanthropic success as inspiring others 
to exceed your generosity. To promote competitive philanthropy, this 
Article proposes a legal regime that includes both more and less 
generous elements for donors than current law. It introduces a 
hierarchy of gift restrictions that calibrates the charitable deduction 
to reflect the burdens that restrictions impose on charities, disfavoring 
perpetuity and mission-diverting restrictions. It recommends 
eschewing the standard donor-centered perspective of the tax law to 
consider the perspective of charities.  
 
While scholars have traditionally analyzed the charitable deduction in 
terms of economic incentives, this Article contends that the deduction 
may be more important in creating expectations and reinforcing social 
norms. By focusing on the largest gifts, this Article breaks new ground 
by integrating concerns about increasing inequality with tax benefits 
for charities. Policy makers can better design the tax law to address 
inequality while furthering the dual goals of distributing away from 
the very rich and protecting charities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider this tale of two gifts. In November 2015, the New York 
Philharmonic’s concert hall at Lincoln Center became David Geffen Hall 
when the media mogul donated $100 million towards its estimated $500 
million renovation.1 The building had been called Avery Fisher Hall since 
1973, when Mr. Fisher donated $10.5 million.2 Though the hall had been in 
desperate need of renovation for some time, Lincoln Center for the Performing 
Arts had been paralyzed since 2002, when Fisher’s children threatened to sue 
if his name were removed.3 Lincoln Center could not have had a public battle 
with the heirs of a major donor because it might have chilled other potential 
                                                                                                                 
 1 Robin Pogrebin, David Geffen Captures Naming Rights to Avery Fisher Hall with 
Donation, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/arts/david-
geffen-captures-naming-rights-to-avery-fisher-hall-with-donation.html (on file with Ohio 
State Law Journal). 
 2 John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in Charitable Naming 
Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 449 (2005). 
 3 See id. at 449–57 (detailing the whole story). 
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donors.4 The Geffen deal was only possible because the Fisher children agreed 
to allow Lincoln Center to rename the building in exchange for $15 million.5 
This is an unhappy story because the gift transaction netted only $85 million 
for the charity to do its work; that $15 million could have made a lot of music. 
And the worst part is that the agreement with Geffen obligates his name to 
remain on the hall in perpetuity.6 
The second story is a happy one. It is about a gift to Jazz at Lincoln Center 
(JALC), which is part of the same performing arts complex as Geffen Hall.7 
When JALC first opened in 2004, an intimate concert space was named for 
Herb Allen.8 Jazz needed a fresh infusion of cash ten years later, so Allen 
challenged other philanthropists to top his gift by offering to relinquish his 
name on the theater.9 Helen and Robert Appel rose to that challenge, and gave 
$20 million, the largest gift ever received by JALC.10 The room is now the 
Appel Room.11 This is a story of “competitive philanthropy.” It is the 
exemplary story because it defines success as a philanthropist in a very 
particular way: you are a successful philanthropist if you inspire other people 
to be even more generous than you are.12 This definition of success is a win-
win situation for donors and charities because it maximizes dollars for 
charitable purposes and rewards donors with exceptional reputational benefits. 
This Article argues that the law should do more to encourage and celebrate it. 
The law provides tax benefits to charities—including tax exemption for 
organizations13 and deductions for donations to them14—in order to subsidize 
                                                                                                                 
 4 The heirs did not actually sue, so we do not know whether they could have 
prevailed if they had. They would have had a difficult time establishing standing to sue, 
because heirs’ standing to enforce gifts is restricted. See Evelyn Brody, From the Dead 
Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 
1183, 1186–87, 1198, 1203 (2007) (reviewing a donor’s rights to enforce a charity’s 
performance of a gift in different contexts). But see Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. 
Ctr., 281 A.D.2d 127, 140–41 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (allowing the executrix of a donor’s 
estate to sue in that capacity).  
 5 Robin Pogrebin, Lincoln Center To Rename Avery Fisher Hall, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/arts/music/lincoln-center-to-rename-
avery-fisher-hall.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (“Lincoln Center is essentially 
paying the family $15 million for permission to drop the name . . . .”). 
 6 Pogrebin, supra note 1. 
 7 See Frederick P. Rose Hall, LINCOLN CTR., 
http://www.lincolncenter.org/venue/frederick-p-rose-hall [http://perma.cc/68BZ-LDDJ]. 
 8 See Lucy Cohen Blatter, A Room by Any Other Name, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 25, 
2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-room-by-any-other-name-1393382627 (on file with 
Ohio State Law Journal). 
 9 See id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See Linda Sugin, Your Name on a Building and a Tax Break, Too, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/opinion/rethinking-taxes-and-
david-geffens-gift-for-avery-fisher-hall.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).  
 13 I.R.C. § 501(a) (2012). 
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the goods that charities provide.15 Charities must have public purposes under 
the law,16 and private funding of those public purposes relieves burdens on 
government, fosters socially beneficial experimentation, and challenges 
government orthodoxy.17 The exemption for charities and the deduction for 
donors are two of the most enduring provisions in the tax law.18 They 
empower individuals to choose causes that will receive indirect government 
subsidy, while still demanding that individuals provide their primary support.19 
Fostering competitive philanthropy holds tremendous potential to improve 
charitable tax law and to combat inequality. The tax law does not do enough to 
distinguish large gifts—which are crucial to charities, important to donors, and 
vital to beneficiaries—from small ones. It does not recognize the power 
dynamic that characterizes the relationship of mega-gift donors with the 
institutions they support, in which donors have all the leverage. And the law 
does not appreciate the burden that large gifts with restrictions impose on 
                                                                                                                 
 14 Id. § 170(a)(1). 
 15 The traditional justification for tax benefits is a subsidy theory that focuses on the 
goods that charities provide. See JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION 
275–76 (5th ed. 2015) (excerpt from Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax 
Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in 4 DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 
(1977)). Other theories justify the benefits on other grounds. See, e.g., FISHMAN ET AL., 
supra, at 278–89 (citing excerpts from Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The 
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 
(1976), and Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from 
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981)).  
 16 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (listing allowable purposes); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) 
(2017) (including requirement that an organization “serve[] a public rather than a private 
interest” to receive the charitable tax exemption). 
 17 See Dennis R. Young & John Casey, Supplementary, Complementary, or 
Adversarial?: Nonprofit-Government Relations, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT 37, 37–
80 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2017) (describing role of nonprofit 
organizations in society); see also Linda Sugin, Rhetoric and Reality in the Tax Law of 
Charity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607, 2607–08 (2016) (comparing public purposes with 
private operation and funding). 
 18 The exemption was part of the first income tax in 1913. Kenneth Liles & Cynthia 
Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Charities: A Prelude to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1975, at 7–20 (detailing history of 
charitable exemptions). The deduction was adopted in the infant stages of the income tax in 
1917. War Revenue Act, ch. 63, sec. 1201(2), § 5, 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917); Joseph J. 
Thorndike, How the Charity Deduction Made the World Safe for Philanthropy, TAX 
ANALYSTS (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/972168BEA0B68D8585257B160048D
D4A?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/3CT7-Q5FB] (“The deduction for charitable 
contributions is one of the oldest preferences in the tax law . . . .”). 
 19 The charitable deduction subsidizes giving to the extent of the donor’s marginal 
rate of tax. For example, if the taxpayer has a marginal rate of 35%, a $100 gift to charity 
has an after-tax cost of $65 to the donor, and a tax subsidy of $35. For a discussion of the 
incidence of the government subsidy, see Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and 
Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 23–26 (2011). 
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charitable organizations, or the race to the bottom that charities engage in to 
attract them. 
Fostering competitive philanthropy would also help deconcentrate wealth 
by encouraging greater charitable giving. The law’s one-size-fits-all approach 
to charitable gifts is a missed opportunity to address the growing problem of 
high-end income inequality20 and the wealth concentration it fosters. The 
highest .1% and .01% of the income distribution have garnered an increasing 
share of total wealth and income over time.21 While the highest earners have 
enjoyed all the economic gains in recent years, and those at the very top have 
been the biggest winners, the law has not responded by increasing taxes on 
those at the top. In 2017, the highest marginal income tax rate applied to 
taxpayers who earn $400,000 as well as those who earn $400,000,000.22 
Unfortunately, it is harder than one might expect to simply tax this inequality 
away. Top earners have an arsenal of avoidance schemes, both legal and 
illegal, to minimize their liabilities, and incentives for tax minimization and 
evasion rise along with rates.23  
In identifying a deficiency in existing charitable tax law and offering a 
solution, this Article breaks new ground by integrating and analyzing what 
seem to be disparate concerns. Lawmakers need to think beyond tax rates to 
ameliorate inequality. Tax provisions that are uniquely relevant to the elite 
should be designed to reduce concentrations of income and wealth. By 
                                                                                                                 
 20 “High-end inequality” is a term coined by Daniel Shaviro to refer to the increasing 
concentration of income and wealth at the highest levels. See Daniel Shaviro, The 
Mapmaker’s Dilemma in Evaluating High-End Inequality, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 83, 86 
(2016). 
 21 Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in The United States Since 
1913: Evidence From Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 520–21 (2016) 
(breaking down the very top by wealth based on income data); see also THOMAS PIKETTY, 
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 170–77 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014) 
(concluding that when returns to capital exceed growth, inequality increases). The richest 
.1% owned 22% of the total wealth in 2012, 15% more than in 1978. Saez & Zucman, 
supra, at 519. The top .01%’s income peaked in 2007, immediately before the financial 
crisis, when its share of total income was even higher than it was in the 1920s, the age of 
plutocrats. Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the 
United States fig.3 (Jan. 25, 2015) https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/N635-GXB6] (updated with 2013 Preliminary Estimates). The 
highest earning .01% earned at least $8.5 million in 2013—about 5% of total income, up 
from about 1% in the 1970s. Id. 
 22 For 2017, individual taxpayers have a 39.6% marginal rate of tax for all income in 
excess of $418,400. Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707, § 3.01(1)(c). The top rate for 
single filers begins at $500,000 under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 
11001, § 1, 131 Stat. 2054, 2055 (2017). 
 23 See GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX 
HAVENS 3 (Teresa Lavender Fagan trans., 2015) (“On a global scale, 8% of the financial 
wealth of households is held in tax havens.”). See generally Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and 
Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 569, 571 (2006) (discussing a variety of tax avoidance and evasion techniques and 
recommending specific penalties to deter such behavior). 
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focusing on the particular problems and potential benefits of mega-gifts to 
charity, the tax law of charity could do three things. First, it could reduce 
income inequality, a policy that the tax law is suited to address, but challenged 
in implementing. Second, it could disincentivize long-term gift restrictions that 
burden charities. Third, and most importantly, the law could create 
expectations of competition in generosity that maximize total charitable gifts 
over time. A more nuanced legal regime could define different standards that 
vary according to income and wealth, and demand that the very rich show 
great generosity to justify the prestige and power that their charitable gifts 
confer. In these ways, the tax law could increase the public value of private 
philanthropy. 
While scholars have traditionally analyzed the charitable contribution 
deduction by evaluating it in terms of economic incentives,24 this Article 
maintains that the deduction may be more important in defining social norms. 
Donors give to charity for many reasons, both economic and noneconomic.25 
Mega-gifts to charity are the sole prerogative of a tiny slice of the very rich26 
for whom philanthropy is a central and defining cultural institution.27 In 2016, 
there were twelve charitable gifts in excess of $100,000,000, and six more at 
exactly that amount.28 That may seem like too few for the law to worry about, 
until you consider that the total amount of those mega-gifts was over $4.2 
billion.29 The United Way, historically the leading fundraiser,30 raised a mere 
$3.7 billion that year.31  
This Article argues that the law of charity should encourage and celebrate 
competitive philanthropy. Competitive philanthropy is a more specific notion 
of the good than exists in the current tax law concerning charity, and it 
suggests that some gifts to charity are better than others, and should be 
recognized as such by the law.32 The rules for charitable naming rights are a 
                                                                                                                 
 24 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 25 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 26 See Maria Di Mento, Megagifts Rise in 2016, with 12 Topping $100 Million, 
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Megagifts-
Rise-in-2016-With/238768 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). 
 27 See generally FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF 
ELITE PHILANTHROPY (1995) (offering several arguments and themes whose purpose is to 
provide a larger picture of contemporary elite philanthropy). 
 28 Di Mento, supra note 26. 
 29 $42,277,200,000 to be exact. See id. 
 30 It has now been bested by Fidelity’s donor-advised fund. Drew Lindsay et al., 
Fidelity Charitable Pushes United Way out of Top Place in Ranking of the 400 U.S. 
Charities That Raise the Most, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Fidelity-Charitable-Knocks/238167 (on file with 
Ohio State Law Journal). 
 31 Drew Lindsay et al., Fidelity Overtakes United Way as New Charity Champion, 
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 27, 2016), [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].  
 32 Maimonides introduced a hierarchy of giving, though his ideal valued anonymity, 
which competitive philanthropy rejects. See Matnot Anyim 10:7–14 (Mishneh Torah); see 
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model for implementing a competitive philanthropy regime because naming 
rights are exclusive to the largest gifts to charity.33 By focusing on the largest 
gifts, policy makers can better design the tax law to address inequality while 
furthering the dual tax and nonprofit policy goals of distributing away from the 
very rich and protecting charities. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II argues that the tax law of 
philanthropy should focus on the rich to reduce concentrations of wealth, 
benefit charities, and reinforce social norms. It challenges the conventional 
economic framework of the charitable deduction by considering noneconomic 
motivations for charitable giving, and it recommends eschewing the standard 
taxpayer-centric perspective in the law. In addition, Part II explains why rising 
income and wealth inequality is important and troublesome, and why the tax 
law of charity is an appropriate vehicle for addressing it. Part III reviews the 
law of charitable naming rights, a paradigm for both the opportunities and 
hazards in elite philanthropy. It argues that naming rights are good for 
charities because naming gifts encourage other large donations, and naming 
rights are less burdensome for charities than other restrictions. However, 
naming rights can also be costly for charities, primarily on account of 
perpetuity and the increasing contractualization of large gifts. Part IV 
advocates for competitive philanthropy and proposes a legal regime to 
promote it that includes both more and less generous elements than current 
law. It recommends that the charitable deduction be calibrated according to the 
benefit received by charities, and that donors who practice competitive 
philanthropy should be entitled to tax bonuses. In creating a legal hierarchy for 
giving, a tax regime built on competitive philanthropy would both benefit 
charities and reduce the concentrations of wealth that high-end inequality has 
stimulated. Anticipating concern from the charitable sector, Part IV.D 
responds to potential critiques. Part V briefly concludes. 
                                                                                                                 
also Jacob Neusner & Alan J. Avery-Peck, Altruism in Classical Judaism, in ALTRUISM IN 
WORLD RELIGIONS, 31, 35–36 (Jacob Neusner & Bruce D. Chilton eds., 2005) (discussing 
Maimonides’s “eight stages of tzedakah” which works to identify a place for altruism in 
the transactions of philanthropy). 
 33 This Article’s reference to naming rights includes when institutions honor donors 
on the front of buildings, in the title of institutional programs, and by including a donor’s 
name in the name of the institution. The Canadian Minister of Health wants the 
government to ban hospitals from renaming themselves for wealthy donors. See Robert 
Benzie, Hoskins Wants To Ban Ontario Hospitals from Being Renamed for Donors, 
TORONTO STAR (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.thestar.com/news/queenspark/2017/02/01/hoskins-wants-to-ban-ontario-
hospitals-from-being-renamed-for-donors.html [https://perma.cc/XD22-PUDC] (“The 
purpose of this directive is to . . . ensure the names used by hospitals reflect their role as 
publicly supported organizations operating within a universal, publicly funded health care 
system . . . .”). 
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II. CHARITY LAW NEEDS NEW DIRECTION 
A. The Tax Law of Philanthropy Should Focus on the Rich 
It makes sense to narrowly tailor the law of philanthropy to the very 
wealthy for three reasons. First, that’s where the money is. Second, that’s 
where the law can tap into a cultural phenomenon that is already strong. And 
third, that’s where there is the greatest imbalance in power between donors 
and charities that law could ameliorate. The only place where the law of 
charity seems to currently distinguish the rich from the merely affluent is in 
the rules for private foundations, which are restrictive and skeptical of the 
generosity of those who establish them.34 A more complete regime designed 
with the very rich in mind is overdue. 
1. Follow the Money 
The 400 richest people in America—members of the Forbes 400—held an 
average of $6 billion in wealth each in 2016, the most ever.35 The poorest 
among them had $1.7 billion and 153 billionaires weren’t rich enough to be 
included in the list.36 According to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) most 
recent analysis, there were 51,965 individuals with net wealth in excess of $20 
million.37 Incomes at the top have also risen; in order to be among the 16,300 
families in the top hundredth of a percent (.01%) of the income distribution in 
2013, a person had to have earned at least $8.5 million dollars that year.38 
These statistics indicate that there is a lot of money at the top that could go to 
charity. 
                                                                                                                 
 34 The current version of the rules for private foundations was adopted in 1969 in 
response to concerns that the rich were using private foundations to privately benefit from 
their wealth while simultaneously enjoying a charitable deduction. See STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, AT 29–62 (Comm. Print 1970) (describing new rules and 
reasons for their adoption). 
 35 Their combined net worth was $2.4 trillion. Kerry A. Dolan & Luisa Kroll, Inside 
The 2016 Forbes 400: Facts and Figures About America’s Richest People, FORBES (Oct. 4, 
2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2016/10/04/inside-the-2016-forbes-400-
facts-and-figures-about-americas-richest-people/?ss=forbes400#5afde1a23973 
[https://perma.cc/G47U-LRFV]. 
 36 Id. 
 37 SOI Tax Stats—All Top Wealthholders by Size of Net Worth, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-all-top-wealthholders-by-size-of-net-worth 
(click “2013 link”) (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (last updated Oct. 31, 2017). 
Every three years, the IRS estimates the net worth of individuals in connection with 
reporting under the estate and gift tax. SOI Tax Stats—Personal Wealth Statistics, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-personal-wealth-statistics [https://perma.cc/RW33-
ZACF]. 
 38 Saez & Zucman, supra note 21, fig.3. 
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The information on charitable giving by income level is not as detailed at 
the top as the data on income and wealth. Nevertheless, there is sufficient data 
to indicate that the most giving comes from the highest earners. A 2002 study 
concluded that taxpayers with over $1 million of income gave 16.2% of all 
contributions, even though they were just .4% of all families.39 The top 2% of 
U.S. households “contribute an average of 4.4[%] of their income to charitable 
causes and in aggregate approximately 37[%] of all charitable dollars . . . .”40 
The .4% of wealthiest families, who had net worth over $10 million, gave 
20.5% of all charitable contributions.41 Only 7% of households donated 50% 
of all gifts in 2000.42 Based on IRS data, the National Center for Charitable 
Statistics of the Urban Institute has estimated charitable giving by income 
level, aggregating all households with income in excess of $200,000.43 That 
analysis reveals two important facts: first, that a substantial portion of the total 
dollars contributed to charity comes from the highest-income taxpayers, $76 
billion out of $179 billion.44 And second, that high-income taxpayers donate a 
greater percentage of their income than do average taxpayers.45 Consequently, 
it is pretty clear that the law of philanthropy should consider the rich distinctly 
significant. 
2. Competitive Philanthropy is a Social Phenomenon 
Philanthropy is a uniquely important social institution for the rich. Twenty 
years ago, the sociologist Francie Ostrower interviewed a sample of 
philanthropists and described a fascinating world of expectations, norms, and 
hierarchies among the wealthy.46 She found that giving was an important 
indicator of class status that creates community among the wealthy.47 Her 
philanthropists had a particularly American character, emphasizing private 
initiative and skepticism of government, and they were motivated by a sense 
                                                                                                                 
 39 See John J. Havens et al., Charitable Giving: How Much, by Whom, to What, and 
How?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 542, 547 tbl.23.4 (Walter W. 
Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
 40 Id. at 546. 
 41 Id. at 548 tbl.23.5. 
 42 Id. at 546. 
 43 Nat’l Ctr. for Charitable Statistics, Charitable Giving in America: Some Facts and 
Figures, NCCS, http://nccs.urban.org/data-statistics/charitable-giving-america-some-facts-
and-figures [https://perma.cc/QZ3X-XKYP] [hereinafter Charitable Giving]. 
 44 Returns with $200,000 or more adjusted gross income constitute 3.7% of the total 
number of returns filed. They included 30% of total income and 42% of all charitable 
contributions reported. Urban Institute, Charitable Giving and Adjusted Gross Income by 
Income Level, NCCS, http://nccsweb.urban.org/tablewiz/showreport.php.  
 45 The average is 2.3%, while high-income taxpayers donate 4.4%. Havens et al., 
supra note 39, at 245–46 & fig.23.1.   
 46 See OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 6. 
 47 Id. 
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of obligation, which she described as independent of tax benefits.48 She also 
found that the rich participated in philanthropy primarily to impress each 
other—not to justify their outsize gains compared to the rest of society.49 
Ostrower concluded that “wealthy donors are generally more focused on their 
peers, rather than those outside their class, as the audience for their 
philanthropy.”50 Among the wealthy, community credibility and participation 
depend on giving and serving on boards, and there is a status ratchet going 
back and forth between elite organizations and wealthy individuals.51 
“[P]hilanthropy is not merely an isolated activity, but part of a way of life for 
donors.”52 
Other scholars reinforce Ostrower’s conclusions. They have shown that 
people pay attention to the gifts that others give,53 and use philanthropy as a 
signal to show that they are virtuous.54 “Research has shown time and again 
that charitable giving is connected to a donor’s involvement in various social 
networks, to opportunities for participation, and to identifying with a cause.”55 
Charitable giving is a good way for individuals to signal wealth56 and 
altruism.57 People donate publicly to show that they are both generous and 
successful,58 even where “conspicuous consumption” signaling success would 
not be socially acceptable.59 Fundraisers are well aware of the contest among 
philanthropists. They use mechanisms such as matching grants, auctions, class 
levels of gifts, public shows of support, and standup fundraising to encourage 
competition among donors.60 Board members at elite institutions are expected 
                                                                                                                 
 48 Id. at 8, 12, 114, 121. 
 49 Id. at 13. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See id. at 42, 68 (“While philanthropy needs money to survive, it needs status to 
attract money.”). 
 52 OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 72. 
 53 See Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 
39, at 568, 577. 
 54 ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 34 (2000). 
 55 Havens et al., supra note 39, at 553. 
 56 See Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, Short Paper, A Signaling Explanation for 
Charity, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1019, 1019 (1996). 
 57 See Dan Ariely et al., Short Paper, Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation 
and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 544, 544–46 (2009) 
(finding that monetary incentives interact negatively with image concerns even though 
participants did not reduce prosocial public acts on account of monetary incentives). 
 58 E.g., William K. Jaeger, Status Seeking and Social Welfare: Is There Virtue in 
Vanity? 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 361, 364 (2004); see also William T. Harbaugh, The Prestige 
Motive for Making Charitable Transfers, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 277, 281 (1998) (“The results 
support the hypothesis that donors have a taste for prestige, and they show that a 
substantial portion of donations can be attributed to it.”) 
 59 See Glazer & Konrad, supra note 56, at 1019. 
 60 See e.g., OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 58 (describing card-calling in Jewish 
fundraising); Vesterlund, supra note 53, at 577 (noting that matches and raffles increase 
contributions). 
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to donate at certain levels and one of their central jobs on the board is to 
inspire donations from others.  
The “giving pledge” epitomizes the social phenomenon. The pledge is an 
initiative that was started in 2010 by Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, two of the 
wealthiest men in America.61 Signatories to it promise to give at least half of 
their wealth to charity.62 In the first year, 57 families in the United States made 
the pledge.63 It now includes 168 individuals and families.64 A website tracks 
those who have signed on, describes the causes they support, and monitors 
their wealth. It is a very exclusive club that only the extremely rich and 
exceptionally philanthropic can join.65 The website, operated by the 
Foundation Center, functions as a reminder to other wealthy individuals that 
they have fallen behind their peers.66  
Eric Posner writes that charitable giving is a powerful way “in which 
people convert cash into reputation.”67 He describes the competition for status 
among philanthropists as a “prisoners’ dilemma” that promotes giving.68 
Posner observes that potential donors make gifts to assert status, regardless of 
whether they succeed.69 If their gifts exceed the gifts given by others, they 
succeed in gaining status.70 If they do not give, they will lose status relative to 
others who do give.71 So people choose to give.72 It is a prisoner’s dilemma 
because if others give also, a donor does not increase his relative status, failing 
                                                                                                                 
 61 Catherine Clifford, These 14 Billionaires Just Promised To Give away More than 
Half of Their Money Like Bill Gates and Warren Buffet, CNBC (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/31/14-billionaires-signed-bill-gates-and-warren-buffetts-
giving-pledge.html [https://perma.cc/95SM-CC6T]. Bill Gates is #1 and Warren Buffett is 
#3, having just been bumped from his long-time perch at #2 by Jeff Bezos. Kate Vinton, 
Jeff Bezos Becomes Second Richest Person on the Forbes 400, Ending Warren Buffett’s 
15-Year Reign, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2016/10/04/jeff-bezos-becomes-second-richest-
person-on-the-forbes-400-ending-warren-buffetts-15-year-
reign/?ss=forbes400#4ec898d35775 [https://perma.cc/EKZ8-N89E]. 
 62 A Commitment to Philanthropy, GIVING PLEDGE, https://givingpledge.org/ 
[http://perma.cc/693F-SFAB]. 
 63 Eye on the Giving Pledge, GLASSPOCKETS, http://glasspockets.org/philanthropy-in-
focus/eye-on-the-giving-pledge/profiles/(sortby)/dateoldest [https://perma.cc/32MZ-F68J] 
(click “view all 168 profiles”). 
 64 A Closer Look, GLASSPOCKETS, http://glasspockets.org/philanthropy-in-focus/eye-
on-the-giving-pledge/a-closer-look [https://perma.cc/JX9X-JCB9]. 
 65 Eye on the Giving Pledge, GLASSPOCKETS, http://glasspockets.org/philanthropy-in-
focus/eye-on-the-giving-pledge [https://perma.cc/7EVK-L7PR] (“With an estimated net 
worth of more than $800 billion, the 168 Giving Pledge participants represent a potentially 
game-changing force in philanthropy.”). 
 66 See id. 
 67 POSNER, supra note 54, at 49. 
 68 Id. at 61. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
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in his purpose.73 Posner concludes that all donors would be better off if they 
did not give. 74 
If private consumption and charitable provision were equivalent, Posner’s 
conclusion might be compelling. But given the role of charities in producing 
important public goods, and the law’s fundamental policy supporting charities, 
Posner’s prisoner’s dilemma is actually a good thing. By vying with each other 
for status, donors forego private consumption and increase their support for 
charities. The status contest produces important positive externalities in the 
form of increased donations that benefit individuals other than donors. 
Charities and their beneficiaries are clearly better off on account of this status-
seeking dynamic. Rather than lament the contest, the law should harness it 
more effectively. Philanthropy is already an important way of life for the rich, 
apart from the legal rules, but those rules can reinforce and mold the culture of 
philanthropy and define its ideals to maximize the benefits that have produced 
charity’s privileged place under the law.  
3. The Law Can Give Charities Some Power 
The third reason to think about creating more law to govern the largest 
gifts is the danger of suboptimal agreements between donors and charities, 
which are most likely when donations are large. Only very large gifts to 
charity merit individual contracts that place obligations on recipient 
organizations that they do not choose. Small donors can make gifts to 
restricted funds, but those funds are defined by the organization in a way that 
maximizes its charitable goals. For example, a university is likely to have a 
dedicated fund for financial aid that small donors can contribute to if they 
want to restrict the use of their gifts to that purpose. But small donors are in no 
position to demand that the organization use their gifts for purposes of their 
own choosing. To the contrary, large donors can induce charities to take on 
new responsibilities—even ones that are arguably inconsistent with an 
organization’s charitable mission. These gifts divert the attention of managers, 
even if they do not divert other resources held by the organization. Few 
institutions have the wealth or the courage to turn down gifts that encroach on 
their managerial prerogative.75 The law could do more to empower charitable 
institutions going into negotiations so they can insist only on terms that further 
                                                                                                                 
 73 POSNER, supra note 54, at 61. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Yale University returned a $20 million gift that Lee Bass had given to fund a course 
in Western Civilization. Bass’ demand that he be allowed to approve the program’s faculty 
was too much for Yale to tolerate. The university negotiated with the donor for months 
over the terms of the program before returning the gift. Jacques Steinberg, Yale Returns 
$20 Million to an Unhappy Patron, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/15/us/yale-returns-20-million-to-an-unhappy-
patron.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). 
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their mission and resist terms that impose long-term obligations and significant 
costs on their charitable programs.76 
There are aspects of the charitable deduction under current law that 
effectively distinguish high-income from low-income taxpayers, but they 
create categories that are too broad to target the unique issues relevant only to 
those at the top. For example, the charitable deduction is only available to 
itemizers, which only about one-third of taxpayers choose.77 That percentage 
is projected to go down under the Tax Cut and Jobs Act.78 Since most 
taxpayers claim the standard deduction, they have no use for the charitable 
contribution deduction.79 The deduction provides no incentive for non-
itemizers to give because it does not reduce the price of their charitable giving. 
But most high-bracket taxpayers do itemize,80 so the charitable deduction 
reduces their cost of giving by their marginal rate of tax. 
The higher the marginal rate of tax, the more the deduction reduces the 
price of giving.81 Stanley Surrey treated this phenomenon as an upside-down 
subsidy because it gives the highest income taxpayers the greatest tax savings 
on account of their charitable gifts.82 Many believe that a subsidy dependent 
on a taxpayer’s marginal rate of tax makes the deduction unfair.83 But if it is 
                                                                                                                 
 76 See infra Part IV.C. 
 77 It is not included in the deductions allowed to determine adjusted gross income. 
I.R.C. § 62(a) (2012).  
 78 Section 11021 increases the standard deduction for taxable years 2018–2025. Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 11021, § 63(c), 131 Stat. 2054, 2072–73 
(2017). The Tax Policy Center estimates that twenty-seven million fewer taxpayers will 
itemize deductions in 2018. Howard Gleckman, How Changes to SALT Will Affect 
Itemizers, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Dec. 21, 2017), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/how-changes-salt-will-affect-itemizers 
[https://perma.cc/P8MH-3B98]. Twenty-one million fewer will claim a deduction for 
charitable giving. Howard Gleckman, 21 Million Taxpayers Will Stop Taking the 
Charitable Deduction Under the TCJA, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Jan. 8, 2018), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/21-million-taxpayers-will-stop-taking-charitable-
deduction-under-tcja [https://perma.cc/6A8Z-XU87].  
 79 In 2013, 68.5% of taxpayers chose not to itemize. Scott Greenberg, Who Itemizes 
Deductions?, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 22, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/who-itemizes-
deductions [https://perma.cc/3HSQ-SK5S]. The charitable deduction is a below-the-line 
itemized deduction, so taxpayers must choose between it and the standard deduction, but 
not both. See I.R.C. §§ 62–63. 
 80 Indeed, 93.5% of those with income over $200,000 did itemize. Greenberg, supra 
note 79.  
 81 With a 40% marginal rate of tax, a $100 contribution has an after-tax cost of $60; 
with a 15% marginal rate, the after-tax cost is $85. This means that high-bracket taxpayers 
can gross up their contributions more than low-bracket taxpayers, at the same after-tax 
cost. 
 82 STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 136 (1973). 
 83 Proposals for refundable credits imply that the subsidy should be uniform. See Lily 
L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 
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an effective incentive for giving, then donors increase their contributions on 
account of it, and the benefit is passed along to the recipient charities. Only if 
the deduction is ineffective in inducing people to increase their gifts is it a 
benefit to the donors, and not the institutions to which they give.84 
In addition, the upside-down nature of the subsidy is not so clear. Larger 
gifts cannot be as narrowly self-serving as smaller gifts because it is harder for 
a donor to capture all the (charitable) benefits from a large gift. For example, a 
person who gives $50 to the local public radio station finances a small amount 
of music broadcast, and he is likely to receive $50 of listening pleasure. His 
gift may be equivalent to his allocable cost of the station’s production. But a 
$1 million gift can finance a lot of music and is likely to provide benefits 
beyond the donor’s own. 
The upside-down subsidy disappears for some of the very wealthiest 
philanthropists because they are unable to deduct their gifts. Thanks to 
President Trump, we know that Warren Buffett cannot use the charitable 
contribution deduction. In 2015, Buffett gave $2.86 billion to charity, but 
deducted only $3.5 million.85 Since the deduction is limited by statute to a 
maximum of 50% of income,86 philanthropists who donate out of their wealth 
(and not their income) may find themselves in the same position as low-
income non-itemizers; their marginal contributions are not deductible at all. 
For these very wealthy taxpayers, § 170 offers no price adjustment and 
consequently no financial incentive to give. The next Part argues that the law 
is still an important signal of social value, even where it provides no economic 
incentive. 
B. The Charitable Deduction Creates Both Incentives and Social 
Signals 
1. The Economic Analysis Is Not Dispositive 
Scholarly examination of the charitable deduction often starts and ends 
with an economic analysis. It goes like this: the deduction reduces the price of 
giving, so it encourages people to give more than they otherwise would. This 
increases the private funding of charities, and causes the government to 
                                                                                                                 
59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006) (arguing that proposals for refundable credits imply that 
the subsidy should be uniform). 
 84 As a policy matter, this would make the deduction a waste of government 
resources. See Sugin, supra note 19, at 23 (arguing that identifying the recipient of the 
subsidy is important, if a tax expenditure subsidizes). 
 85 Buffett publicly released his returns as a challenge to candidate Trump. Jen 
Wieczner, How Warren Buffett’s Released Tax Returns Prove Trump Wrong, FORTUNE 
(Oct. 10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/10/warren-buffett-taxes-trump/ 
[https://perma.cc/4E42-AJFS]. 
 86 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2012). Some gifts are subject to a 20% or 30% limitation, 
depending on the property and the recipient organization. Id. § 170(b)(1)(B), (D). 
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subsidize their activities. The deduction is an appropriate use of government 
resources because it is a way to overcome the tendency of individuals to free 
ride on the benefits provided by others. Private funding of charities overcomes 
the problem of underfunding that would occur if the government funded 
directly because enthusiastic donors can choose to pay more privately than 
they would indirectly through tax collections that imposed costs on all 
taxpayers.87  
If we think about the charitable deduction solely in economic incentive 
terms, we would expect that high-bracket taxpayers would give money and 
low-bracket taxpayers would volunteer because the value of the deduction is 
highest for high-bracket taxpayers and less for low-bracket taxpayers. We 
would also expect that non-itemizers would not give money at all, since they 
get no tax benefit for it. But that is not the case.88 Giving and volunteering 
seem to be in a symbiotic relationship, so that people give to the organizations 
with which they are involved.89  
The economic model also assumes that both government funding and 
giving by others should crowd out private giving.90 This suggests that donors 
should reduce their contributions when others increase theirs. But the evidence 
suggests that there is, in fact, very little crowding out.91 People seem to give 
without caring whether the recipient is already sufficiently funded.92 People 
give for many reasons that are not accounted for in the economic models, such 
as social norms, community interaction, and the status of other contributors.93 
Other scholars have observed that “[b]ecause humans think about gifts in a 
way that fundamentally differs from how they think about exchange, 
                                                                                                                 
 87 See Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a 
Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY, 171, 171–76 
(Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975) (explaining the median voter problem). Private giving allows 
for price discrimination among donors, who can decide how much they value a charitable 
output. 
 88 See Havens et al., supra note 39, at 545–56 (explaining that low-income people are 
less likely to give than higher-income people, but those that do give a higher than average 
percentage of their income). 
 89 OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 18. 
 90 See generally Richard Steinberg, Does Government Spending Crowd Out 
Donations? Interpreting the Evidence, 62 ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 591 (1991) 
(reviewing the literature on the relationship between government spending and private 
giving crowd out). 
 91 See id. at 608–09. 
 92 For example, Harvard University already has the largest endowment, and yet it 
continues to receive substantial contributions, both large and small. For details from recent 
years, see Annual Financial Report, HARVARD UNIV., http://finance.harvard.edu/annual-
report [https://perma.cc/GS4V-UHVV]. 
 93 See Vesterlund, supra note 53, at 580–81 (“The classical model of charitable giving 
relies on a series of assumptions, some of which may be a poor approximation to the 
environment in which giving takes place . . . . We find that a number of factors may reverse 
the prediction that an increase in a donor’s contribution causes those of others to 
decrease.”). 
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straightforward economic arguments are often systematically incorrect when 
applied to gift-giving situations.”94 
Economists do not agree on the incentive effects of the charitable 
deduction. Some studies have found that the deduction is a very effective 
inducement to giving, and the revenue lost is more than compensated for by 
larger gifts.95 Others have disputed that finding, concluding that individuals do 
not increase their real giving enough to compensate for the government’s loss 
in tax revenue,96 and that the form of subsidy may be what primarily 
determines the impact.97 The best conclusion on a review of the evidence 
seems to be that “it is still unclear how much changes in price affect charitable 
giving. More research . . . will be needed to definitively answer this difficult 
and important question.”98 
The inconclusiveness of the data on whether the deduction actually 
incentivizes people to give, and the evidence that people do not behave as the 
                                                                                                                 
 94 Reid Kress Weisbord & Peter DeScioli, The Effects of Donor Standing on 
Philanthropy: Insights from the Psychology of Gift-Giving, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 225, 256 
(2009/10). 
 95 See, e.g., MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40919, AN OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 49 (2009) (“The 
most recent estimates of the price elasticity of charitable giving by living 
individuals . . . suggest that the elasticity is below one.”); JANE G. GRAVELLE & DONALD J. 
MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40518, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS: THE ITEMIZED 
DEDUCTION CAP AND OTHER FY2010 BUDGET OPTIONS 7–9, 18–19 (2009) (reviewing the 
literature on price elasticity); Jon Bakija & Bradley T. Heim, How Does Charitable Giving 
Respond to Incentives and Income? New Estimates from Panel Data, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 615, 
617 (2011) (finding a persistent price elasticity in excess of one in absolute value); Joseph 
J. Cordes, Re-Thinking the Deduction for Charitable Contributions: Evaluating the Effects 
of Deficit-Reduction Proposals, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 1001, 1002–04 (2011) (reviewing the 
literature on the charitable deduction); see also CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX 
POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING xi (1985) (changes in tax policy can significantly impact 
the level and composition of giving); Gerald E. Auten et al., Short Paper, Charitable 
Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 371, 371 
(2002) (testing whether individuals adjust their giving due to transitory fluctuations); 
Charles T. Clotfelter, The Impact of Tax Reform on Charitable Giving: A 1989 Perspective, 
in DO TAXES MATTER? 203, 215 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990) (explaining that the economic 
model of charitable giving is an incomplete model, therefore contributions through time 
cannot be predicted); John Peloza & Piers Steel, The Price Elasticities of Charitable 
Contributions: A Meta-Analysis, 24 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 260, 260 (2005) (using a 
meta-analysis of studies on the price elasticity of charitable tax deductions to determine the 
effects of changes in their deductibility).  
 96 See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Are Estimated Tax Elasticities Really Just Tax Evasion 
Elasticities? The Case of Charitable Contributions, 71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 517, 522 
(1989). 
 97 See Kimberley Scharf & Sarah Smith, The Price Elasticity of Charitable Giving: 
Does the Form of Tax Relief Matter? 22 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 330, 346 (2015) 
(concluding that offering the subsidy in the form of a match would generate more 
charitable giving). 
 98 Vesterlund, supra note 53, at 570. 
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economic model would predict, should give us pause in relying too heavily on 
economic justifications of the law. If the only reason for the deduction is its 
incentive effect, it may be too ineffective to remain. Until we are able to prove 
that donors increase their gifts by more than the government loses in revenue, 
the economic analysis should make us skeptical of the tax benefits for 
philanthropy.  
However, if—despite the lack of clear economic evidence—the deduction 
seems important, the uncertainty may instead indicate that legal scholarship 
about the deduction has skewed too economic, overlooking an important 
perspective on the role of the tax law. Instead of condemning the deduction, 
the indeterminacy of its economic analysis should lead us to a more social and 
philosophical approach to it. Regardless of whether the deduction actually 
causes people to give more to charity, it is an important element of the law. 
The deduction signals the social importance of pluralism, private initiative, 
arts and culture, education, and community. It also signals a skepticism of 
private consumption to the exclusion of communal support. The deduction is 
how the law honors, as well as encourages, the social functions of charity. 
Philanthropy by the elite is public, while charitable giving by the 
moderately wealthy is more private. This could explain why the charitable 
deduction might be even less important as an economic incentive for the 
super-wealthy than it is for the merely affluent. According to a study by Dan 
Ariely, “private monetary incentives seem to interact negatively with image 
concerns, leading to the result that monetary incentives are more effective in 
motivating private prosocial decisions than ones made in a public setting.”99 
This is relevant to the design of the law for elite philanthropy because it 
reinforces that the economic value of deductions under the income tax are 
much less significant for the wealthiest than they are for less wealthy 
charitable donors. For the most elite philanthropists, image concerns are the 
strongest drivers of philanthropic giving, and the law can define for donors a 
hierarchy of most favored philanthropy. 
2. Charities Produce Multiple Social Goods 
The law of charity is much concerned with the purposes of charities—both 
state and federal law limit their legal categories to organizations that are 
organized to do socially useful things.100 The traditional justification for the 
charitable contribution deduction is that it subsidizes the activities of the 
charitable organization—the good work that charities do.101 So it may seem 
odd to think about designing the law of charity to redistribute away from 
donors and deconcentrate the wealth of the philanthropist class, rather than to 
                                                                                                                 
 99 Ariely et al., supra note 57, at 546. 
 100 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (listing purposes required for exemption as a charity). 
 101 See FISHMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 275–78 (describing traditional subsidy 
theory). 
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redistribute to socially desirable purposes. But we should recognize that one of 
the social goods that charities produce is wealth deconcentration. 
The policy of wealth deconcentration made compelling by increasing 
high-end inequality is not concerned with the purposes or activities of 
recipient organizations, but it offers an additional reason for the law to nudge 
toward increased giving. This is important because many people, and even 
some scholars, link charity law with poverty relief.102 They are critical of the 
elite institutions that are the favored charities of the wealthiest donors.103 
Poverty relief has never been the central concern of charity law—the 
definition of charity has included much broader purposes since its early 
development in England.104 The tax law of charity is not about redistribution 
from rich to poor. If charity law is intended to achieve redistribution, 
redistribution away from the super-rich to anyone else is a reasonable 
redistributive goal. If the top .1% finance goods that are enjoyed by the top 
half of the income distribution, that redistribution increases overall social 
welfare, and is worthwhile, even from a utilitarian perspective.  
In addition, there are many benefits to charitable provision of goods and 
services, apart from the distributional effects on beneficiaries. For example, 
“[p]hilanthropy has a positive long-term externality for society, that is, it 
creates a better society in the long run.”105 Charities are an important check on 
government overreach,106 they empower communities,107 and they foster 
                                                                                                                 
 102 See John D. Colombo, The Role of Redistribution to the Poor in Federal Tax 
Exemption for Charities 4–15 (Annual Conference of the Nat’l Ctr. on Philanthropy & the 
Law, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2350493 [https://perma.cc/4VXP-J2J5] (reviewing 
the literature on redistribution models via federal exemption law). 
 103 See Teresa Odendahl, Charity Begins at Home: Generosity and Self Interest Among 
the Philanthropic Elite, as reprinted in JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS 755, 755 (5th ed. 2016). Education is the most favored sector among the 
highest-income donors, and religion is the most favored sector among the lowest-income 
donors. Charles T. Clotfelter, The Distributional Consequences of Nonprofit Activities, in 
WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 1, 14–16 & tbl.1.5  (Charles T. Clotfelter 
ed., 1995); see also Havens et al., supra note 39, at 558 (“Numerous other studies about the 
wealthy confirm that education is the number–one priority in their charitable giving. In a 
study that asked wealth holders about the policy issues they would like to influence, the 
highest-ranking policy area was improvement of education . . . .”). In 2015, religion 
received 32% of total giving, exceeding every other category. Giving USA: 2015 Was 
America’s Most-Generous Year Ever, GIVING USA (June 13, 2016), 
https://givingusa.org/giving-usa-2016/ [https://perma.cc/PZ55-YBQ5] [hereinafter Giving 
USA]. Education and culture combined received only 20%. Id.   
 104 See Charitable Uses Act 1601, 43 Eliz. c. 4, §§ 1–10 (Eng.). 
 105 ZOLTAN J. ACS, WHY PHILANTHROPY MATTERS 4 (2013). 
 106 See Sugin, supra note 17, at 2627 (“Private organizations are necessary to 
challenge and check government.”); Young & Casey, supra note 17, at 45–48. 
 107 See Rob Atkinson, Tax Favors for Philanthropy: Should Our Republic Underwrite 
De Tocqueville’s Democracy?, 6 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 8–9 (2014). Minority 
communities, in particular, lack sufficient political power to achieve their goals politically. 
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pluralism in society.108 These civic functions of charities are arguably more 
important than their redistributive effects because their antimajoritarian 
functions cannot be accomplished by government. Contrary to the rhetoric in 
charity law that champions charity for “[r]elieving the burdens of 
government,” the private nonprofit sector is a crucial part of the social order 
because it can do things that government cannot, not because it duplicates 
what government does best.109 Distribution remains a core obligation of 
government. 
3. Income Tax Analysis Is Too Donor-Centric 
Scholarly analysis of the charitable deduction has been hampered by its 
treatment as a “personal” deduction of the donor. The conventional approach 
in income tax analysis takes an agnostic approach to the sources and uses of 
economic resources.110 That approach focuses only on the perspective of 
taxpayers, judging individuals according to resources at their disposal.111 
William Andrews’ leading article analyzing the charitable deduction 
established a framework that divides expenditures into the costs of producing 
income (which are not taxed) and the costs of consumption (which are 
taxed).112 He argued that the deduction for charitable giving was appropriate 
because amounts given to charity do not represent private preclusive 
consumption.113 The corollary to this argument is that the deduction should be 
disallowed if evidence shows that the benefit of philanthropy is private. And 
the data seems to indicate that people donate because it benefits them in some 
way, by bolstering their reputation, or giving them a warm glow.114  
But this consumption-defining approach is too limiting in evaluating the 
charitable deduction because it ignores the perspective of society as a whole, 
and the broader purposes of taxation. Taxes exist to finance public goods and 
redistribution. Current law focuses on individuals in an attempt to treat people 
in the same position fairly.115 But the larger goals of taxation should inform 
the rules adopted. From that perspective, the consequences of the charitable 
deduction for society as a whole become much more important than the effects 
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on individual consumption. Instead of asking whether individuals receive 
consumption from a particular expenditure, the tax treatment could depend on 
whether society can more effectively provide public goods and redistribution 
with the deduction in place. When the issue is framed that way, the charitable 
deduction is more easily defended. 
The broader perspective allows the law to send a signal that certain kinds 
of benefits—even private ones—are more socially desirable (or tolerable) than 
others. The law can establish a hierarchy of concededly private benefits that 
elevates those that create public goods and devalues those that create public 
harms. If individuals get equal satisfaction from giving to charity (because it 
gives them status, return benefits, warm glow) and buying yachts (because 
they have private preclusive use of them), it is legitimate that the law 
recognizes the costs and benefits to others from the private benefits. Tax 
benefits for charity acknowledges the social preference for charitable goods 
over simple consumer goods.116 
Much of the criticism of elite philanthropy loses its force when we adopt 
the social perspective because the charitable deduction clearly favors public 
goods over private ones.117 In addition, when future beneficiaries are 
considered, the social benefits of charitable gifts increase. Distributional 
effects that spread benefits out of the very top are worthwhile in a world of 
increasing high-end inequality, whether that distribution reaches current 
beneficiaries outside the elite or future beneficiaries. Reductions in inequality 
itself are a social benefit. The charities favored by the rich, education and 
culture,118 create goods that produce growing benefits over time. An 
investment in education today increases the educational level of the living 
generation, which will translate into higher education levels and greater 
knowledge in the next generation.119 Culture is often criticized as the most 
elitist and exclusive recipient of charitable funds, but cultural organizations are 
the repository of both objects and ideas that challenge and enrich society. As 
protectors of history and imagination, cultural organizations both preserve the 
past and create potential for the future. They are in the business of preventing 
rivalry, embodying the very definition of public goods. 
                                                                                                                 
 116 Id. at 48. 
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C. Charity Law Should Address Inequality 
1. Why Care About High-End Inequality? 
There are good arguments that we should not care about high-end 
inequality. Since nobody has a right to a private jet, it is not a fairness problem 
that most of us do not have one. A few lucky people are earning much more 
than the rest of us, but inequality is consistent with distributive justice. By 
some measures, most people have been made better off, even as income 
inequality has increased. As the CEOs and hedge fund managers have enjoyed 
phenomenal returns,120 the rest of us have seen our standards of living rise 
also. Technology has put a smartphone in the pocket of the average American 
teenager, and a flat-screen TV on the wall of virtually every American home. 
If some people are unhappy about the extraordinary gains of a few, it might be 
because they are envious, hardly a problem that a just government should be 
obligated to solve. Government has responsibility for ameliorating suffering at 
the bottom of the income spectrum,121 and the tax law has been a surprisingly 
effective tool in ameliorating poverty.122 But that concern does not extend to 
escalating differences among the wealthy, or the degree of difference in the 
gains enjoyed by those who have gained. 
Divergent theories of distributive justice are consistent in mostly ignoring 
high-end inequality. Such inequality can result even if governments are just, 
according to those theories. For example, equal opportunity is the cornerstone 
of economic justice for some theorists.123 Where there is equal opportunity, 
there should be no post hoc government interference—those who make the 
most out of their equal opportunity should be entitled to enjoy all the fruits of 
their labors.124 This version of an equal opportunity imperative is quite 
extreme, and not all proponents of equal opportunity understand it to imply a 
hands-off approach once opportunity is guaranteed. Ronald Dworkin supports 
taxation as a necessary mechanism to guarantee equality on a recurring basis, 
even where there is equal opportunity to prosper; he rejects the “starting gate” 
theory that the libertarian view of equal opportunity offers.125 But even 
Dworkin is hardly concerned with inequality in outcomes for its own sake—
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his standard of equality of resources anticipates that individuals will make 
different choices that produce different returns.126 Dworkin’s concern is where 
inequality results from factors and forces beyond an individual’s control.127 
Similarly, John Rawls expects that a just society will have unequal 
outcomes.128 His main concern in economic justice is with the least well off.129 
But the most well off are the focus of the high-end inequality debate, so they 
are not at the center of his principles. Some people have suggested that 
economic justice requires a basic minimum guaranteed by government,130 and 
current interest in a universal basic income by both business leaders131 and 
governments132 reinforces the tendency to focus on the bottom of the income 
distribution.133 Rawls’s theory is consistent with guaranteeing a minimum, 
since he demands that individuals have the ability to participate in society, 
which presumably requires some baseline resources.134 
The main reason to care about high-end inequality is political. While 
Rawls is primarily concerned with the least well off, he does suggest that an 
estate or inheritance tax might be necessary.135 He explains that the purpose of 
such a tax on the wealthiest would be “solely to prevent accumulations of 
wealth that are judged to be inimical to background justice.”136 He may have 
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 133 While a universal basic income would be paid to everyone, for high-income 
individuals, the amount received would be more than offset by tax payments. Thus, only 
low-income individuals would receive a net transfer from the government. 
 134 See RAWLS, supra note 121, at 61 (discussing “equal liberties of citizenship”). 
 135 See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 160–61 (Erin Kelly ed., 
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 136 Id. at 161. 
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intended such a tax to help operationalize equal opportunity.137 But it is also 
possible that he believed that excessive concentrations of wealth are too 
dangerous for democratic government.  
While it might be possible to maintain political equality alongside extreme 
economic inequality, the United States today suggests that such a combination 
is challenging. Since money is speech and speech is constitutionally protected, 
the very rich can influence the political process in ways unavailable to the 
poor, or even the moderately well off. In 2016, a tiny percentage of voters had 
an outsized role in financing the election.138 Regulation—or even 
transparency—might allow money and politics to mix with less toxicity, but 
those controls are currently impossible.139 Until there is a way to directly 
control the political power that comes with money, indirect attempts to 
deconcentrate that power will be important. The tax system, because it is 
effective at moving money out of private pockets, can act as a second-best tool 
for addressing the political dangers associated with increasing concentration of 
wealth and income at the top. 
A second reason to care about high-end inequality is social welfare; more 
inequality may make us worse off. There is evidence that poor health 
correlates with low income in a highly unequal society; inequality might be 
making people sick.140 Health researchers hypothesize that reducing inequality 
may make us healthier.141 Economist Robert Frank has argued that increasing 
inequality has made us all worse off because our happiness depends on our 
relative consumption, rather than our direct consumption.142 As income 
inequality has increased, we have suffered because it has become more 
difficult to “keep[] up with the Joneses.”143 Frank observes that as people have 
gotten richer, they consume more and better things, which you might expect 
would make them better off.144 But instead, he believes that increasing 
conspicuous consumption actually reduces overall social welfare.145 He 
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reasons that when the super-rich improve their lifestyle to include yachts and 
estates, the less rich covet those things as well.146 Which makes the not so rich 
want to buy bigger houses and fancier cars than they can comfortably 
afford.147 And so on down the income spectrum. Frank’s central point is that 
increasing inequality encourages everyone to want to live beyond their means, 
which produces dissatisfaction and bankruptcy throughout the income 
spectrum.148 Frank would tax consumption to make it more expensive and 
encourage less of it.149  
2. Taxes Are Not Enough To Deconcentrate Wealth 
If high inequality produces social harms, the most straightforward 
response would be to tax it away. Taxing the rich to ameliorate inequality has 
some virtues that charitable giving does not share. Taxes are coercive, so 
(theoretically) the rich cannot refuse to contribute. Taxes go into the public 
fisc, so democratic institutions decide how to spend the revenue collected. A 
substantial tax on estates or inheritances reduces the resources available to the 
heirs of the wealthiest decedents, and scholars naturally turn to a tax on 
transfers of wealth (or wealth itself) to address the problems of increasing 
wealth concentrations.150 But we have long had an estate tax, and it has never 
effectively broken up concentrations of wealth; despite it, there is greater 
concentration of wealth today than ever.151 A tighter estate tax base along with 
higher rates might do more to deconcentrate wealth, but there is little political 
will to strengthen estate taxation.152 To the contrary, there is widespread 
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hostility to the tax, even among people who never will be lucky enough to 
have to pay it.153 
Philanthropy is more limited in scope than taxing and spending, and it may 
not support the most redistributive priorities. The private philanthropic sector 
is voluntary and privately controlled, and while it is large in the United States 
compared to other countries,154 it cannot compare in size to government 
budgets.155 A robust fiscal system can be quite progressive and redistributive, 
if it is large enough.156 These are reasons to use charity law to supplement 
taxation, but not to replace it. Multiple instruments directed to wealth 
deconcentration are necessary where there is no single approach that offers an 
effective solution. The political reality is that many people are willing to 
support private initiatives that are encouraged and subsidized by law, even 
while they are against direct government intervention that achieves the same 
ends.157 
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More importantly, I am skeptical that we can actually tax the rich 
effectively. In recent decades, the tax rate structure has been relatively 
flat⎯the highest marginal rate was reduced to 28% from 50% in 1986, and has 
not exceeded 40% since.158 The top marginal rate on individual income is now 
37%.159 When incomes were more compressed, there was less reason to slice 
taxpayers into narrow income groups. But today, income inequality has 
increased dramatically,160 so higher rates are necessary to maintain the same 
distribution of the burden.  
More graduated rates are unlikely to make much difference, as a practical 
matter, because current law fails to tax much of the increase in wealth of the 
highest-income individuals. Roadblocks to taxing the rich are part of the 
fundamental structure of the tax law. They include the realization rule,161 the 
exclusion of loan proceeds from income,162 and the step-up in basis of assets 
received by heirs.163 All these elements are basic to the law.164  
An additional impediment to taxing the rich is the massive industry 
peddling quasi-legal and evasive opportunities that use tax shelters, offshore 
strategies, and tax havens. Diversion of income through low-tax countries to 
enjoy low rates of tax, while actually earned in high-tax countries, is a 
daunting challenge to tax authorities.165 While Congress did try to crack down 
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on taxpayers hiding their assets offshore when it adopted the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010,166 opportunities for the rich to hide 
assets in complex structures remain. The government lacks sufficient resources 
to fully enforce the law,167 even where the illegal activity might be easily 
proven. Congress has slashed the IRS’s budget, hobbling enforcement against 
complex and sophisticated targets.168 Enduring Republican hostility to the tax-
collecting agency is axiomatic, even while it is at odds with the government’s 
interest in collecting the revenue that taxpayers owe.169  
These challenges to taxing the rich more effectively suggest that taxation 
(alone) might not be the silver bullet for reducing high-end inequality and 
wealth concentration. Antipathy to taxation has become a central ideological 
obsession of the Republican party,170 but alternative mechanisms for reducing 
high-end inequality might be attractive, even to anti-tax crusaders. Policy 
makers should consider a variety of complementary policies—both within the 
tax law and outside it. There are multiple tools that can ameliorate high-end 
inequality, and a focus on tax rates in particular, and taxation more generally, 
is too limiting.  
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The tax law of charity is a good candidate for this policy because it is 
already part of a redistributive mechanism that moves money from rich people 
to institutions devoted to public purposes. The law of charity can be a 
powerful tool for addressing high-end inequality because it can encourage the 
deconcentration of wealth, without coercing it. When the very richest 
individuals make hundred-million-dollar gifts to charity, that money is not 
available for their heirs to spend. If a legitimate policy goal of estate taxation 
is breaking up concentrations of wealth,171 then it should also be a legitimate 
policy goal of the tax law of charities.172  
Unlike taxation, charity allows resources to move from the rich to 
institutions that are privately controlled. To the extent that policy makers 
object to growing the size of government, substituting charitable gifts for 
taxation promotes redistribution without enlarging government power. People 
deciding whether to make a charitable gift are not faced with the binary choice 
of giving and reducing tax or not giving and paying tax. Instead, they have 
many choices for ways in which they can enjoy benefits at various tax costs. 
Charitable gifts must be understood as one among many options that balance 
private benefits and tax liability. In this world, the tax benefits for charitable 
giving are less important as an economic matter since there are so many 
alternatives that are economically equivalent or better.  
III. CHARITABLE NAMING RIGHTS 
A. Naming Rights Are an Outlier in the Law of Charitable Quid Pro 
Quos 
Donors are allowed a deduction for amounts they give to charity, but only 
if those amounts are “contribution[s] or gift[s].”173 If a person buys something 
from a charity, there is no deduction; tickets to the Philharmonic’s concerts are 
not allowed to be deducted as charitable contributions because they are not 
gifts. A gift must be made with “detached and disinterested generosity.”174 No 
deduction is allowed if the donor expected or received a substantial return 
benefit.175 However, some payments to charity are part gifts and part 
                                                                                                                 
 171 See James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 826–
27 (2001). 
 172 A key observation about that policy is that it says nothing about the spending side. 
A policy to deconcentrate wealth might coexist with a separate policy to maximize the 
well-being of the poor, but the first policy does not inexorably lead to the second. 
 173 I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h) (as amended in 2008). 
 174 Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). 
 175 United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116 (1986) (“A payment of 
money generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the contributor expects a 
substantial benefit in return.”); Rusoff v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 459, 469 (1975), aff’d sub nom. 
Rusoff v. C.I.R., 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977) (“If the transfer is impelled primarily by the 
anticipation of some economic benefit or is in fact an exchange in the form of a substantial 
quid pro quo, it is not a contribution.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h); see also Murphy v. 
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purchases—the cost of a charity dinner includes a donation as well as the price 
for a meal. Only the donation part is deductible.176 The law looks to whether 
there is a return benefit, a quid pro quo, and disallows the deduction to the 
extent that a donor receives something in return.177  
Disqualifying benefits can take various forms, and do not have to be 
received directly from the charity or have clear monetary value.178 In Singer 
Co. v. United States, the Court of Claims held that the sale of sewing machines 
to high schools at a discounted rate was not charitable because the taxpayer’s 
predominant purpose was to encourage students to purchase the taxpayer’s 
machines in later years.179 The expectation of this inchoate benefit—even 
though it was in the future and not directly provided by the recipient 
organization—was a sufficient quid pro quo to preclude the deduction.180 
Services relating to the donated property can destroy the charitable nature of a 
contribution if the donor receives sufficiently valuable return benefits in 
connection with retained rights.181 Disqualifying return benefits can be 
intangible as long as they are consideration for the payment.182 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
Comm’r, 54 T.C. 249, 254–55 (1970) (holding that payments made to an adoption agency 
as a prerequisite to adopting a child were not charitable because they were in exchange for 
services provided by the agency). 
 176 Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117 (establishing rule for dual character 
payments); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105 (taxpayer must prove that amount 
deducted is the excess of the amount paid over the consideration received); see also Kristin 
Balding Gutting, Relighting the Charitable Deduction: A Proposed Public Benefit 
Exception, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 453, 476 (2012) (taxpayers must demonstrate difference in 
value). 
 177 Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105–06 (requiring that charities inform donors 
whether they have received any goods or services in exchange for the payment). Donors 
may only deduct the amount in excess of the market price of whatever they receive. See 
I.R.C. § 170(f)(8). 
 178 See Scheidelman v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The consideration 
need not be financial; medical, educational, scientific, religious, or other benefits can be 
consideration that vitiates charitable intent.”). 
 179 Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 423 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
 180 Id. at 424 (“[P]laintiff expected a return in the nature of future increased sales. This 
expectation, even though perhaps not fully realized, provided a quid pro quo for those 
discounts which was substantial.”). 
 181 See Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 902 F.2d 1540, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(holding that the transfer of certain rights in film stock transferred to the Library of 
Congress, when the film required special care that the Library had to provide to maintain 
the film while the taxpayer retained commercial and access rights to the film, was not 
deductible as a charitable contribution); Rusoff v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 459, 461–63, 472 
(1975) (holding that the transfer of interests in an invention to Columbia University was 
not a charitable contribution where Petitioners reserved for themselves a significant 
percentage of royalties earned pursuant to the licensing arrangement with the university), 
aff’d sub nom. Rusoff v. C.I.R., 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 182 See Derby v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1177, 1188–89 (2008) (holding that 
taxpayers’ transfer of assets to an organization, for which they received “economic 
security” in the form of future guaranteed employment and the freedom to undo the 
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Court has held that even purely religious benefits can constitute a 
disqualifying quid pro quo if the charity charges fixed prices for them, and 
they resemble a market exchange.183 
Naming rights are an exception to these strict quid pro quo rules. Donors 
can receive acknowledgements, including naming rights, without diminution 
in their deductions.184 Currently, no statutes or regulations apply a quid pro 
quo analysis to naming rights received by a donor in exchange for a 
donation.185 The IRS’s most relevant authority is a 1968 ruling that discussed 
levels of membership in organizations and return benefits that come with those 
membership levels, and whether those benefits are substantial enough to 
reduce the charitable deduction for the membership fee.186 The IRS stated that 
membership fees that bring with them rights and privileges that are “incidental 
to making the organization function according to its charitable purposes” are 
contributions because the only return benefit is the “satisfaction of 
participating in furthering the charitable cause.”187 The ruling states: “Such 
privileges as being associated with or being known as a benefactor of the 
organization are not significant return benefits that have a monetary value 
within the meaning of this Revenue Ruling.”188 
                                                                                                                 
transaction at any time, had an “inherently reciprocal nature”); see also Ruddel v. Comm’r, 
71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2419, 2421 (1996) (holding that a payment made as part of a plea 
agreement for a lesser sentence was not a contribution, but “nothing more than part of the 
consideration given by him to avoid incarceration”). 
 183 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 680–81 (1989) (holding that payments to the 
Church of Scientology for auditing and training services were not charitable as there was a 
fixed “market” price for the sessions, refunds would be issued if services went 
unperformed, the Church issued “account cards,” and it barred the provision of sessions for 
free—all indicators of the reciprocal nature of the exchange). 
 184 JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 240 (4th ed., 
Teachers Manual 2010) (“Traditional forms of donor acknowledgement, such as naming a 
building or professorship after the donor, do not negate a donor’s detached and 
disinterested generosity or constitute the type of quid pro quo that will cause reduction in 
the charitable deduction.” (citing Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104)); John D. Colombo, 
The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating 
Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 658 n.4 
(2001) (charities apparently do not describe naming as quid pro quos in their disclosure 
forms); William A. Drennan, Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable Naming 
Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 56 (2011) (“Rather than apply the dual character approach 
without detailed statutory rules, the Treasury Department and the IRS have adopted a series 
of authorities effectively valuing naming rights at zero, which allows naming donors to 
deduct their total transfers to charity.”). 
 185 Drennan, supra note 184, at 56. 
 186 Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104 (“Advice has been requested whether 
membership fees or subscriptions paid to a charitable, educational, scientific, or literary 
organization described in section 170©(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in an 
amount out of proportion to the benefits or privileges offered may be deducted as 
charitable contributions under section 170 of the Code.”).  
 187 Id. at 105. 
 188 Id. 
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Under this ruling, there are two reasons that public donor recognition is 
not considered a quid pro quo: 1) because it is “incidental” to the charitable 
donation, and 2) because it is not significant or substantial.189 Courts have held 
that “incidental” benefits are those received by taxpayers when their donations 
were made without the expectation of a substantial benefit, or motivated by a 
desire to benefit the public, and that such incidental benefits do not reduce the 
amount of the allowable deduction.190 A donor’s request to have her name 
associated with the charity, even if this were the sole motivation in the 
transfer, does not negate the charitable nature of her transfer.191 John Eason 
explains that this is generally because the resulting benefit to a community is 
the primary interest of courts, and naming motives do not detract from that 
benefit but in fact may increase that benefit by inducing others to make 
gifts.192 The IRS has stated explicitly that being known as a benefactor is not a 
significant return benefit.193  
                                                                                                                 
 189 Public recognition has also been considered “incidental” under the rules that 
prohibit private foundations from engaging in self-dealing. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-
2(f)(2) (as amended in 1995) (“[T]he public recognition a person may receive, arising from 
the charitable activities of a private foundation to which such person is a substantial 
contributor, does not in itself result in an act of self-dealing since generally the benefit is 
incidental and tenuous.”); Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383, 383–84 (holding that a 
donation from a private foundation to a public charity that requires the charity to change its 
name to that of a substantial contributor to the foundation for one hundred years, did not 
constitute self-dealing because the benefits to the disqualified person were “incidental and 
tenuous”). 
 190 See Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank of S.C. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900, 906–07 
(W.D.S.C. 1965) (holding that economic benefits received by a bank, when the bank 
transferred land to the highway department out of a feeling of moral obligation “were only 
incidental to the public purpose and public benefit” and therefore did not reduce the bank’s 
charitable deduction). 
 191 See Eason, supra note 2, at 392 (“Determination of the charitable nature of a 
contribution ultimately turns upon the effect of the gift as advancing the public welfare. If 
that end is served, the donor’s personal motivation to perpetuate her name will not defeat 
characterization of the gift as ‘charitable’ under common-law notions of that concept.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 192 Id. at 393. 
 193 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-0172 (Sept. 24, 2010) (“[P]rivileges such as being 
associated with or being known as a benefactor of an organization (for example, being 
memorialized on a plaque or similar commemorative item) are not significant return 
benefits that have a monetary value; therefore, [the Service] do[es] not consider these 
privileges as quid pro quo exchanges that disqualify full deductibility of a charitable 
contribution.”); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-50-009 (Sept. 14, 1993) (“[I]t is well settled that 
the benefits of being known as a benefactor of a charitable organization and the satisfaction 
of furthering a charitable cause are not by themselves enough to prevent the entire payment 
from being a charitable contribution for purposes of section 170 . . . . Accordingly, the fact 
that A and the recommending Director receive these benefits does not affect the 
deductibility of the payments . . . .”). 
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An important assumption in Revenue Ruling 68-432 was that public donor 
recognition has no monetary value.194 While naming rights have no market 
outside of the charitable context, that does not mean they have no monetary 
value at all. As the Avery Fisher story illustrates, there are valuable benefits 
associated with naming rights that donors receive in the form of reputation and 
status enhancement that are worth money.195 These benefits are clearly 
valuable in the eyes of donors, who negotiate for them.196 Donors condition 
their gifts on the naming rights they are promised, and have been known to 
revoke their gifts when the naming is impossible197 or otherwise derailed.198 
Development offices have fee schedules that go with various naming rights, 
making the transaction closely resemble a market exchange.199  
If we were to treat naming rights as a quid pro quo, we would need to 
value them in order to separate the gift from the return benefit. And this is a 
big problem; generally, we don’t know what they are worth. In most cases, it 
is impossible to separate out the correct price of the return benefit because 
there is no noncharitable market that prices donor honors.200 The market for 
getting your name on a major New York institution is pretty well 
                                                                                                                 
 194 Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, 105. 
 195 See Colombo, Marketing of Philanthropy, supra note 184, at 663 (“[I]ndirect 
benefits such as publicizing a donor’s name or the “warm glow” that a donor might feel as 
a result of the gift do not result in a denial of deduction.”); Drennan, supra note 184, at 60 
(“Charitable naming rights can enhance the donor’s personal reputation. Professor Posner 
and others recognize that a substantial charitable gift signals wealth, generosity, and social 
status to others.” (footnote omitted)). 
 196 Kate Harvey, What’s in a Name?: The Delicate Dance Behind Some of Today’s 
Largest Gifts, PHILANTHROPY, Spring 2017, at 16, 18 (“Naming-rights contracts are 
complex business deals. . . . Big bucks are always on the line. These negotiations can feel 
unphilanthropic . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 197 Joan Weill refused to give a pledged $20 million donation when her demand that 
her name be added to the school’s name was denied because it conflicted with the named 
donor’s prior agreement, and a court would not grant a cy pres petition to release the 
restriction. Maria Di Mento, What Goes into a Naming Policy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY 
(July 26, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/What-Goes-Into-a-Naming-
Policy/237253 [https://perma.cc/7U37-EQQ8]; Benjamin Mueller & Kristin Hussey, Judge 
Rejects Request by Paul Smith’s College To Change Its Name, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015), 
https://nyti.ms/1VDTZYZ (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). See infra notes 222–238 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Paul Smith’s College gift. 
 198 University of Michigan lost a $3 million gift after students protested the name 
change proposed. David Jesse, U-M’s Mark Bernstein Withdraws $3 Million over Naming 
Flap, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 22, 2016), http://on.freep.com/2aeCWfG 
[https://perma.cc/X64D-NYJT]. 
 199 My own school has placed its donation schedule in connection with our new 
building online. Drew Lindsay, As Menu of Naming Rights Expands, Fundraisers Pitch 
Options Online, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (June 1, 2015), 
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/As-Menu-of-Naming-Rights/230469 (on file with 
Ohio State Law Journal). 
 200 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 706–07 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
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established—it costs around $100 million.201 But that does not mean the quid 
pro quo valuation is $100 million; there is no charitable gift when David 
Geffen writes a $100 million check to a charity. The payment includes some 
donation, even if we generally don’t know how much. As Justice O’Connor 
explained: 
 It becomes impossible, however, to compute the “contribution” portion 
of a payment to a charity where what is received in return is not merely an 
intangible, but an intangible (or, for that matter a tangible) that is not bought 
and sold except in donative contexts so that the only “market” price against 
which it can be evaluated is a market price that always includes donations. 
Suppose, for example, that the charitable organization that traditionally 
solicits donations on Veterans Day, in exchange for which it gives the donor 
an imitation poppy bearing its name, were to establish a flat rule that no one 
gets a poppy without a donation of at least $10. One would have to say that 
the “market” rate for such poppies was $10, but it would assuredly not be true 
that everyone who “bought” a poppy for $10 made no contribution. . . . [The] 
“going rate” includes a contribution.202 
Thanks to the children of Avery Fisher, we actually do know how much 
your name on Philharmonic Hall at Lincoln Center is worth. It cost $15 
million for Lincoln Center to buy the naming rights back, so that must be how 
much David Geffen’s name on the building is worth.203 In that one case, at 
least, there is little justification for not treating the naming right as a quid pro 
quo with an ascertainable value that reduces the amount of the allowable 
deduction. While the Avery Fisher dispute did not produce a legal precedent, it 
did tell us a lot about how to think about the market value of naming rights. 
B. Naming Rights Are Good for Charities  
It is no accident that the largest philanthropic gifts are acknowledged by 
naming rights.204 Donors like to see their names in lights.205 The insignificant 
                                                                                                                 
 201 That was the amount that produced the Schwarzman Building at the New York 
Public Library (yes, the one with the lions), and the Koch Theater and Geffen Theater, both 
at Lincoln Center. See Robin Pogrebin, A $100 Million Donation to the N.Y. Public 
Library, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/arts/design/11expa.html (on file with Ohio State Law 
Journal); Pogrebin, supra note 1; Robin Pogrebin, David H. Koch To Give $100 Million to 
Theater, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/arts/10linc.html 
(on file with Ohio State Law Journal).  
 202 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 706–07 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 203 See Pogrebin, supra note 1. 
 204 See Di Mento, supra note 26 (describing the largest gifts endowing named centers, 
buildings, etc.). 
 205 David Geffen’s name is raised, backed by lights, and prominently displayed on the 
outer wall of the building. See Once You’re Here, N.Y. PHILHARMONIC, 
https://nyphil.org/plan-your-visit/once-here [https://perma.cc/KE8F-HV9C]. 
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number of large anonymous contributions is a testament to the value of public 
recognition.206 Charities understandably try to make their donors happy, but 
donor satisfaction is not the best reason for applauding naming rights.  
Naming rights may be the perfect return benefit for charities to give to 
donors because they are something a charity can give away without actually 
diminishing itself. First, naming rights are reserved for the largest gifts. They 
carry so much prestige that donors must give very generously to be eligible for 
them.207 The power to grant a naming right, and bestow the reputational 
benefit that goes along with it, gives charities substantial leverage to raise 
large gifts.208 Naming rights make a donor’s generosity very visible, and 
produce only visibility. According to Dan Ariely’s “effectiveness hypothesis,” 
extrinsic rewards (like financial subsidies) are less effective the greater the 
visibility of the prosocial act.209 The donor can stroll past and confirm that the 
charity has upheld its part of the deal.  
Second, because naming rights are valuable, donors who receive them may 
not demand other return benefits from the charity, making the gift less costly 
for the charity overall. While sometimes a building is constructed on a donor’s 
promise, naming rights are often the mechanism that charities use to spearhead 
a capital project already chosen by the institution.210 If we care about charities 
having sufficient resources and being able to do their work without excessive 
interference in their missions, we should celebrate naming rights. Compared to 
other types of gift restrictions,211 naming rights are preferable because they are 
less likely to divert the organization from its core charitable mission. Naming 
rights have the potential to impinge only minimally on the fiduciary discretion 
of charitable directors since they do not implicate the governance structure of 
an organization. Neither do naming rights require substantial ongoing attention 
by the organization to monitoring and fulfillment, unlike gifts that require 
                                                                                                                 
 206 See Glazer & Konrad, supra note 56, at 1021 (explaining that anonymous donations 
often make up significantly fewer than 1% of total donations). 
 207 Drennan, supra note 183, at 47. 
 208 See Michelle Lemming, Asking Price on the Naming of Harvard’s Med School 
Could Reach $1B, NONPROFIT Q. (Jan. 27, 2016), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/01/27/asking-price-on-the-naming-of-harvards-med-
school-could-reach-1b/ [https://perma.cc/XS88-PM82] (noting that naming opportunities 
continue to escalate). 
 209 See Ariely et al., supra note 57, at 545, 547 (“The results strongly support the 
hypotheses that image motivation is important for prosocial behavior . . . .”). 
 210 The Philharmonic hall’s need for renovation was long-standing. The orchestra even 
considered abandoning Lincoln Center for Carnegie Hall. Ralph Blumenthal & Robin 
Pogrebin, The Philharmonic Agrees To Move to Carnegie Hall, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2003), 
https://nyti.ms/2jZnPGL [https://perma.cc/DUD2-WSDB] (“For the Philharmonic, going to 
Carnegie Hall means it can exchange the flawed acoustics of Avery Fisher Hall for a stage 
of undisputed sound quality, without having to foot the bill for a costly renovation.”). 
 211 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1-170A-1(e) (as amended in 2005) (providing the example 
of a donor who transfers land to a city government for as long as it is used by the city as a 
public park). 
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charities to treat particular assets in a special way212 or to operate endowed 
programs. 
Third, naming gifts can jump–start a larger fundraising campaign.213 
Studies show that subsequent donors are more likely to make larger gifts if 
they follow major donors, so naming rights help bring in more than just the 
named donor’s gift.214 Naming rights gifts are meaningful support for 
charities, and while the agreements take time to negotiate and conclude, 215 
once the name is on the building, there may be little ongoing expense. Once a 
name is in place, there is no expense in keeping it emblazoned where it is.  
So naming rights are an optimal tool. Charities are well aware of the 
power of naming rights, and they may be the single most valuable asset that 
charities have to monetize. The law should do more to help prevent them from 
being squandered. 
C. Naming Rights Are Also Costly for Charities 
Despite all these benefits, naming rights impose hidden costs on charities. 
While they are initially a low-cost benefit that charities can give donors, they 
become more costly for charities over time. There is a balance to be struck 
between maximizing the value received by donors and maximizing the power 
of charities to use naming rights to their advantage. While donors care about 
memorializing themselves (forever) after death,216 that desire is a 
noncharitable interest that must be evaluated with attention to the long-term 
burden that perpetual naming rights impose.  
The law of naming rights offers bad incentives and socially detrimental 
norms. It encourages restrictions that reduce the value of gifts and impose 
long-term burdens on charities. Additionally, it encourages increasing 
contractualization of charitable gifts, undermining generosity. It fosters a 
competitive race to the bottom among charities, who are competing with each 
other to lure donors. Finally, it fails to honor or incentivize the Allen Room 
story of competitive philanthropy because relinquishing a name has no legal 
consequence.  
                                                                                                                 
 212 Richard M. Horwood & John R. Wiktor, Gift Acceptance Agreements Avoid 
Headaches for Charitable Donors, Their Descendants, and the Charities They Wish To 
Support, 24 J. TAX’N INV. 355, 357–58 (2007) (providing an example of a “restrictive gift,” 
and noting that “the restrictive aspect of a gift will not show its dark side until many years 
after it was made, at which time the restrictions may become very onerous, or render the 
gift virtually unusable as circumstances change”). 
 213 This was why it was so important for Lincoln Center to secure the Geffen gift. See 
Eason, supra note 2, at 378; Pogrebin, supra note 1.  
 214 Vesterlund, supra note 53, at 578 (“[A] large initial contribution can increase the 
donations of those who follow.”). 
 215 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 216 See OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 101 (“[A]n identification with the recipient 
organization literally becomes a way to perpetuate the donor’s own name and identity after 
death.”). 
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1. Forever Is Too Long for Anything 
Perpetuity is bad. Every restricted gift that continues in perpetuity creates 
long-term liabilities for an organization. Times change, along with the 
methods for carrying out even timeless charitable purposes.217 Buildings do 
not last forever, and rights related to buildings should be consistent with the 
physical limitations of buildings. Unfortunately, the way that perpetual naming 
rights agreements work, charities have only one chance to get any value out of 
them. Even at $100 million, if the rights are perpetual, they are undervalued. 
In fifty years, what will today’s $100 million be worth? Fifty years ago, Avery 
Fisher gave $10.5 million, and his name was on the building for fifty 
years218—that seems like a lot of value received by the Fisher family—
particularly since we know that the same naming opportunity garners $100 
million today.219 The best kind of naming rights are limited in time, so the 
charity can resell them, and so philanthropists can compete for them 
sequentially. 
Philippe de Montebello, the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s former 
director, famously quipped that perpetuity means fifty years.220 But most 
philanthropists and legal authorities disagree. State legislatures or courts could 
impose a limited duration interpretation onto the legal meaning of 
“perpetuity,” but they do not, and donors, charities, and the courts seem to 
think that perpetuity actually means forever.221  
Consider the recent New York case in which Paul Smith’s College wanted 
to rename itself to include Joan Weill, who had promised a $20 million gift.222 
The board of trustees of the college had voted unanimously to approve the 
                                                                                                                 
 217 The Metropolitan Opera Guild recently filed a cy pres petition to release it from the 
restrictions contained in a gift of opera memorabilia since nobody seems to believe 
(anymore) that it matters to opera education what opera stars owned. See Petition at 17, In 
re Metro. Opera Guild, Inc., No. 159855/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty., Nov. 22, 2016) 
(on file with author). 
 218 Eason, supra note 2, at 449. 
 219 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 220 Rebecca Mead, Den of Antiquity: The Met Defends Its Treasures, NEW YORKER 
(Apr. 9, 2007), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/04/09/den-of-antiquity 
[perma.cc/5SY7-674S]. 
 (“[Leon] Levy, in his 2002 memoir, ‘The Mind of Wall Street,’ recalled when Philippe de 
Montebello, paying a call to Levy’s home in search of funding, promised that the sculpture 
court would be named for him ‘in perpetuity.’ (Levy asked how long in perpetuity was. 
Fifty years, de Montebello replied. Levy bargained him up to seventy-five.)”). 
 221 See generally Susan N. Gary, History and Policy: Who Should Control Charitable 
Gifts?, 81 ALB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6). 
 222 In re Paul Smith’s College of Arts and Sciences, No. 2015-0597, at 5 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct., Franklin Cty., Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.nacua.org/docs/default-source/new-cases-
and-developments/new-documents/new-cases-october-
2015/in_re_paul_smithcollegeartssciences.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAS7-EK3D] 
(unpublished decision). 
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name change and the New York Attorney General had no objection.223 But the 
school needed court approval to change the name because the 1928 bequest 
that established the college provided that it “be forever known as ‘Paul Smiths 
[sic] College of Arts and Sciences.’”224 Restricted gifts bind charities 
indefinitely, unless a court releases the restriction in a proceeding brought by 
the organization.225  
The legal doctrine for releasing restrictions in charitable gifts is strict: the 
donor’s general intent must have been broad enough to overcome a limitation 
that has become impracticable or impossible to carry out.226 The New York cy 
pres law applied by the Paul Smith’s court states: 
[W]henever it appears to such court that circumstances have so changed since 
the execution of an instrument making a disposition for religious, charitable, 
educational or benevolent purposes as to render impracticable or impossible 
a literal compliance with the terms of such disposition, the court may, on 
application of the trustee or of the person having custody of the property 
subject to the disposition and on such notice as the court may direct, make an 
order or decree directing that such disposition be administered and applied in 
such manner as in the judgment of the court will most effectively accomplish 
its general purposes . . . .227 
The court also relied on the less demanding standard in New York’s 
Prudent Management of Institutional Funds statute, which allows modification 
of a “wasteful” restriction in an endowment fund.228 
The college had argued that the restrictions on the gift prevented it from 
modernizing and diversifying.229 It offered evidence of its declining 
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enrollment and the changing nature of college students since the time of the 
original gift.230 Nevertheless, the New York court refused to allow the name 
change.231 The court approached the college’s petition narrowly, treating the 
request as clearly violating the original restriction, even though Paul Smith’s 
name would continue alongside Joan Weill’s.232 It also held the school to a 
high standard of impossibility—requiring that its “continued existence [be] 
largely dependent on changing its name.”233 The court implied that the petition 
could only be granted if the naming restriction undermined the charitable 
purposes of the original testator,234 a standard arguably more demanding than 
the statute requires. Applying that higher standard, the court concluded that 
enforcing the restriction did not frustrate the testator’s general purpose, even 
though the court acknowledged that the purpose of the original bequest was 
“to bring the advantages of higher education within the reach of those young 
people who might not otherwise have had it,” a purpose requiring substantial 
resources.235 The college chose to accept the ruling and not appeal the 
decision.236 
The story of Joan Weill and Paul Smith’s College resembles the story of 
Avery Fisher Hall. They both reflect the tension between an incentive to make 
a large initial gift and an incentive to make and encourage later, larger gifts. 
The problem for Paul Smith’s College derived from the fact that the court was 
upholding a prior restriction on naming. That decision deprived the college of 
the power to control its own name and consequently denied it the value it 
might have enjoyed from allowing a new donor to name the college. The law 
and the legal system were crucially involved in denying the college control 
over a resource that it should have owned. If the legal standard reflected a 
reasonable limitation on naming rights, the court would have been in a better 
position to grant the college’s request in a cy pres proceeding. 
The litigation itself is part of the problem for charities. If a charity wants 
to change the terms of an agreement, it needs to get a court to approve it in a 
cy pres proceeding, which can be very expensive. Cy pres litigation of this 
type, particularly if it has a high profile,237 also puts charities in a difficult 
position because their willingness to pursue a cy pres action to release a prior 
donor’s restrictions may chill current donors who perceive that action as 
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disrespectful of donors and insufficiently serious about the negotiated terms of 
a gift.238 So it is no surprise that the board of Paul Smith’s College chose not 
to appeal the trial court’s order.  
Limited duration naming rights are sometimes part of an agreement, but 
they seem less common than perpetual rights. Recent examples limiting 
duration seem to be a feature of naming agreements where the state is a party 
to the agreement—because it owns the building or the land underneath it. The 
New York State Theater became the David Koch Theater for only fifty 
years239 because the theater is publicly owned.240 That agreement shows that 
the government is inclined to protect its own interests, but it has not extended 
that protection to charities generally.  
2. Increasing Contractualization Is Harmful 
Major gift contracts are governed by agreements that can run one hundred 
pages, describing the precise size, material, and style of the donor’s name on a 
building.241 These agreements are expensive to negotiate and create rights to 
private enforcement of charitable gifts that expose charities to future costs. 
Increasing contractualization may simply be a product of the evolution of the 
charitable sector from voluntary associations to more professional, 
well-managed institutions. More charities have lawyers on their staffs than 
they did a generation ago.  
Contractualization of philanthropy makes the law more private, even 
though charitable organizations have public missions that are overseen by state 
regulators and that such philanthropy must support.242 While the private nature 
of charities has many advantages, contractualization weakens charities. They 
are always in the position of supplicant as they enter gift agreements, and the 
dynamic inevitably leads donors to believe they can and should oversee 
charitable strategy.243 Charities and philanthropists are equally responsible for 
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this trend, since charities are as enthusiastic about offering naming rights as 
donors are in receiving them.244 But they are nevertheless harmed. 
The contractual nature of the relationship between Paul Smith’s College 
and Joan Weill made it seem reasonable for Weill to withdraw her gift when 
the cy pres petition failed.245 Commentators were incensed by her lack of 
generosity,246 but her response to the deal’s failure was simply the 
consequence of the contractual frame and the negotiating posture it creates. 
Similarly, a large gift to the University of Michigan was recently withdrawn 
when the naming opportunity was frustrated. Donors had promised $3 million 
for a multicultural institution, which would bear their name on the building.247 
When Michigan students learned that the donors’ name would replace the 
name of the only African American to be acknowledged on a university 
building, there were protests, and the donors withdrew their gift.248 The failure 
of these gifts is hard to accept—they suggest that Weill and the college were 
not able to figure out some other way to acknowledge her generosity short of 
changing the name of the college. The University of Michigan is a big school; 
there must be plenty of opportunities to honor donors. Insisting on a particular 
naming opportunity—or withdrawing the gift if that opportunity becomes 
unavailable—too strongly resembles a purchase. The donors withdrew their 
gifts because they considered their transactions with the organizations to 
involve a negotiated exchange, indistinguishable from a business contract.  
By ignoring return benefits to donors, the law provides an incentive to 
treat a naming gift as an exchange transaction, rather than as an altruistic act. 
Donors can demand return benefits without reducing their tax deduction, so 
the law creates the impression that the naming benefits are unimportant.249 
Those demands give donors greater control over recipient institutions and 
threaten the charitable missions they have. As one commentator wrote:  
What is clear is that the focus of major donors has become more a 
consideration of their own status, needs, and satisfactions than a concern 
about the institutions and people they are funding. This shift in attitude is 
partly the result of society’s relatively recent embrace of celebrity and public 
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recognition, but it is also driven by the new fundraisers who will do anything 
to secure money for their clients.250  
The increasing contractualization of the relationship between donors and 
charities is worrisome, and the law should help to recalibrate that relationship 
so that charities have a more equal role.  
IV. FOSTERING COMPETITIVE PHILANTHROPY 
A. Principles for the Law of Competitive Philanthropy 
Competition among philanthropists runs in two directions. On one hand, 
philanthropists are clearly engaged in a competition with each other over 
flaunting their generosity, and major gifts continue to grow.251 At the same 
time, donor demands for recognition apparently have increased also. Standing 
in the middle of the plaza at Lincoln Center, one sees David Koch’s 2008 gift 
and David Geffen’s 2015 gift facing off against one another. Koch’s name on 
the south building is strikingly less prominent than Geffen’s name on the north 
building. Koch’s name is under the building’s portico and shaded for much of 
the day. Pedestrians on the plaza need to be quite close to the building to see 
the name. To the contrary, Geffen’s name is on the outside of the building, 
above the main entrance and surrounded by lights, so that it glows in the dark. 
It is possible to see it from the seventh floor a block away.252 There’s a tension 
between these two forms of competition between philanthropists: the first one 
creates potential benefits for charitable institutions while the second creates 
costs for them.  
Perpetuity fits into this competition because it stymies future 
competitors.253 While each philanthropist might be trying to outdo the one 
who came before him, he is also trying to prevent being outdone by the one to 
follow. Preventing displacement by the next philanthropist is difficult, 
particularly if that person arrives after today’s philanthropist is dead. The more 
permanent the restrictions imposed by the first donor, the harder it becomes 
for future philanthropists to publicly outdo ones that came before them. Once 
the naming rights have been claimed, the earlier donor can preclude them from 
ever being available again. Thus, while the two types of competition differ 
importantly for charities, for large donors they are two parts of a single 
concern. Outbidding other philanthropists and gaining permanent recognition 
both contribute to a donor’s reputational benefits. It is because these two 
things are related from the perspective of donors that it is important that the 
law create a mechanism to distinguish them.  
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By adopting the perspective of charities, the law can emphasize the 
desirability of competitive philanthropy in increasing gifts and growing 
charitable organizations, while at the same time tamping down the donor 
aggrandizement that so naturally goes along with this kind of competition. The 
law should distinguish the super-rich from other taxpayers to craft the law with 
attention to both the social context of philanthropy for the elite and the weaker 
economic incentives from the deduction for them.  
While it might be too late to change the exchange nature of transactions 
between philanthropists and institutions, the law can still alter the baseline of 
expectation for duration. The charitable deduction is indifferent between two 
qualitatively different things, because it treats the gift with naming rights in 
perpetuity the same as an equivalent gift without them.254 In this way, the law 
has created an expectation of permanence for restricted gifts generally and 
naming rights in particular. Perpetuity is normal for restricted gifts because the 
law treats it as though it is. Under current law, it is legitimate for donors to 
expect that their names will remain on buildings forever because the tax 
benefits for perpetual names are undiminished and state courts will enforce 
naming restrictions.255 Donors who demand perpetuity either fail to appreciate 
the burden of perpetual naming rights on the organizations that grant them,256 
or else are more concerned with their own prestige than supporting the mission 
of the organization. If donors make gifts because they are committed to the 
organization’s charitable mission, as they claim to be,257 they should care 
about the costs of restrictions their gifts impose on recipients. If they do not 
care,258 the law should intrude to control those costs. Given how valuable 
naming rights can potentially be to a charity, the design of the law is crucial to 
helping them reap the greatest value. 
The law needs to play a bigger role in the traditionally private sphere of 
philanthropic gifts because charities are unable, or unwilling, to manage the 
long-term liabilities they assume from perpetual restrictions. Though 
undoubtedly still hurting from the Avery Fisher debacle, Lincoln Center gave 
David Geffen naming rights in perpetuity also.259 Like individuals, charities 
seem to engage in in hyperbolic discounting, valuing the future too little 
compared to the present.260 Today’s gift officers will no longer be employed 
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by the charity when the restrictions become burdensome. They are so 
interested in the current receipt of gifts that they ignore the long-term burden 
those gifts impose. Perhaps the law needs to be more paternalistic and require 
that charitable institutions properly value both the current benefits that they 
receive, as well as the long-term liabilities they incur in all restricted gifts they 
accept. The law should make a hierarchy of gifts transparent, as a way to 
educate institutions and donors about the net benefits and burdens of restricted 
gifts.  
While states could prohibit charities from granting perpetual rights,261 
such a prohibition would be inconsistent with the current mode of charitable 
regulation under state law.262 Charities are fundamentally private institutions, 
even though they have public purposes. There are many good reasons for 
keeping them that way.263 An institution’s relationship with donors is 
primarily defined by the trustees who control the institution and their 
agreements with those donors, with the law providing a background constraint 
on the distribution of profits.264 While the law could continue to minimally 
regulate, it could be more effective in shaping that relationship.265  
B. Creating a Legal Hierarchy of Restricted Gifts 
Gifts with naming rights are a subset of restricted gifts given to charity. 
All restricted gifts constrain the recipient charity in some way. From the 
perspective of charities, however, restrictions on the use, investment, and 
disposition of donations can differ significantly; some restrictions impose 
more burdensome obligations than others. Compare a restricted gift to fund (1) 
a program that already exists, (2) a program that does not yet exist, and (3) a 
gift to name a building. A restricted gift to fund a program that exists imposes 
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the smallest burden on a charity. There is no marginal cost to the charity from 
the restriction as long as the charity had expected to spend at least as much as 
the gift on the program. This is likely the case with many gifts “restricted” for 
financial aid since universities generally have large financial aid budgets. A 
donor-restricted gift for aid is unlikely to increase total financial aid assistance. 
Money is fungible, so the restricted gift could free up funds for nonfinancial 
aid purposes. From the perspective of charities, this is a good thing—
charitable directors are obligated to make policy decisions for the 
organizations they oversee, and restricted gifts that support their choices 
strengthen their governance and reinforce their priorities. Some naming 
opportunities fall into this category, such as named scholarships or chairs at 
universities that fund students or faculty positions. They are not finite, and one 
chair or scholarship can lead to others. In these cases, the cost to charities of 
restricted gifts is the minimal investment in recordkeeping and reporting 
necessary to confirm that the gift was accounted for properly.  
Contrast the financial aid gifts with restricted gifts that endow a new 
project or program that the charity was not otherwise planning to fund. It is not 
unusual for institutions to take on projects that attract funding, and large 
donors may encourage institutions to grow in a particular direction. This is not 
always a bad thing—donors can perform important monitoring functions that 
keep organizations vital and relevant.266 But sometimes these donor-driven 
projects can distract from the organization’s central mission, and donors are 
not always in the best position to understand the challenges and needs of an 
institution.267 Donor activism is a hallmark of the new generation of young 
philanthropists, but the jury is still out on whether it produces more good than 
the traditional model of greater deferral to charity directors and managers.268 
The benefits that donors receive in this situation, while not a quid pro quo 
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under the legal standard,269 include the value of seeing their vision carried out 
by an organization with public prestige, a well-functioning administration, and 
professional expertise.  
More important than the benefit to the donors is the burden on charities 
that are bound by restrictions. The charity’s obligation to comply with the 
terms of a gift can be substantial when donors are furthering their own 
strategic objectives through the charity. Even where the donor provides the 
money, complying with the terms of the gift requires institutional energy that 
might have gone to other priorities.270 The burden can be particularly heavy 
when the gift provides only seed funding, and the institution commits itself to 
raising the remaining funds or diverting resources from elsewhere. Where a 
university commits to run an institute, it assumes a long-term commitment of 
time and money.  
Recall that naming rights are ignored under the quid pro quo rules because 
they are categorized as acknowledgements.271 An acknowledgment is “[t]he 
expression of gratitude or appreciation for something.”272 An expression of 
gratitude should be unique and personal to the donor. At some point in time, 
naming rights cease to be recognition for donors’ generosity and become 
permanent monuments to their memory. For example, if the party attempting 
to enforce a naming obligation is not the donor, but a descendent of the donor, 
the arrangement goes beyond the concept of an acknowledgement.273 The 
morphing of acknowledgements into more robust and permanent rights is the 
product of the increasing contractualization of charitable gifts, discussed 
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above.274 Unlike personal expressions of gratitude, contractual rights can 
survive the parties to the contract and extend to their successors. To bolster the 
purpose of gratitude in acknowledgements, the rules for naming rights should 
be sensitive to the lifespan of donors. While donors sometimes claim to care 
about their legacies after they are dead,275 others recognize that they can get 
no benefit after death.276 The law should establish that an acknowledgement 
cannot primarily constitute legacy building after death. 
Restricted gifts of property, rather than money, can be even more 
burdensome to charities. Categorizing charitable gifts by the burden imposed 
on recipients should extend beyond naming rights so that the law favors less 
burdensome gifts. For example, the law should recognize the substantial 
burdens that certain types of property gifts impose on recipients.277 Buildings 
that represent donor-driven capital growth similarly impose perpetual carrying 
costs.278 A donor who insists that a particular gifted building be used by the 
charity gives a much less valuable gift, from the perspective of the charity, 
than the donor who allows the charity to sell the building and use the proceeds 
as it sees fit.279 Gifts of art are particularly susceptible to turning from assets 
into liabilities because they can be fragile and require costly conservation.280 
They become an increasing long-term burden over time because standards in 
the museum community impose strict limits on an institution’s ability to 
monetize artworks and devote the proceeds to purposes other than 
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reinvestment in other works.281 Consequently, accepting a work of art often 
means committing to insuring it, storing it, and caring for it (or another 
substitute work) in perpetuity. Given this burden, the law should encourage 
donors of artwork to accompany their gifts with endowments of money to pay 
these associated expenses;282 donors who gift art without an endowment 
should have a diminished tax deduction. 
Tax benefits for donors should reflect the balance of benefits and burden 
to the charity. Gifts that burden charities least should be encouraged more by 
the law than gifts that hamstring the charity, or otherwise limit its discretion to 
decide how to provide the best charitable program. I have never understood 
why the tax law would encourage donors to give appreciated property more 
than it encourages gifts of cash.283 Similarly, it makes no sense for the law to 
favor gifts of food or computer equipment over money.284 Gifts of money that 
charities are allowed to use as they see fit give charities the most value 
because the charities are then able to decide what is most essential, and use the 
gift to achieve the most benefit. Most restricted gifts—either restricted as to 
                                                                                                                 
 281 The Association of Art Museum Directors has announced: “Funds received from 
the disposal of a deaccessioned work shall not be used for operations or capital expenses. 
Such funds, including any earnings and appreciation thereon, may be used only for the 
acquisition of works in a manner consistent with the museum’s policy on the use of 
restricted acquisition funds.” ASS’N. OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., REPORT OF THE AAMD TASK 
FORCE OF DEACCESSION 5 (June 2010), https://www.scribd.com/document/33789958/2010-
AAMD-Deaccessioning-Policy (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). The American 
Alliance of Museums has a similar policy. See AM. ALL. OF MUSEUMS, CODE OF ETHICS 
FOR MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/code-
of-ethics [http://perma.cc/MQB6-3XX8] (“Proceeds from the sale of nonliving collections 
are to be used consistent with the established standards of the museum’s discipline, but in 
no event shall they be used for anything other than acquisition or direct care of 
collections.”). 
 282 Museums are well aware of this. When Crystal Bridges Museum agreed to buy a 
50% interest in a collection owned by Fisk University, it also agreed to provide care and 
maintenance of the collection. See Stieglitz Collection Art-Sharing Agreement Finalized, 
CRYSTAL BRIDGES BLOG (Aug. 3, 2012), http://crystalbridges.org/blog/stieglitz-collection-
art-sharing-agreement-finalized/ [http://perma.cc/4VHV-QR35]; see also Nina Siegal, $25 
Million Gift to Ackland Art Museum at University of North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 
2017), https://nyti.ms/2jZe3rj (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (gift of $17 million 
worth of art accompanied by $8 million cash endowment). 
 283 See Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System 
Reimagined, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 263, 268 (2013) (advocating repeal of the appreciated 
property rule); Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and 
the Realization of Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1, 35–38 (2002); Linda Sugin, 
Encouraging Corporate Charity, 26 VA. TAX REV. 125, 158 (2006) (“There is little reason 
why the law should encourage corporations to give property rather than cash to charity 
because the charitable organization can better determine the goods it needs to carry out its 
purposes.”). 
 284 See I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)–(4) (2012). 
48 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:{issue no.} 
purpose or restricted in property—are less valuable to a charity than the 
equivalent in cash.285 The law should elevate those gifts accordingly.  
C. Add Sticks and Extra Carrots to the Charitable Deduction 
How might the charitable deduction account for all these concerns? We 
should reconsider the quid pro quo rules to better account for the effects of 
different restrictions on charities, and favor unrestricted gifts.286 In addition, 
the law should encourage “restrictions” that actually produce greater benefit to 
charities by encouraging others to give, including naming rights. Restrictions 
that impose long-term obligations or liabilities should be disfavored by a 
diminished deduction, even if there is nothing that constitutes a return benefit 
that fits in the quid pro quo framework.  
The law could be quite specific depending on the type of gift.287 For 
example, it could encourage donors to endow their gifts of art with gifts of 
money for conservation by tax-favoring gifts with money endowments. The 
regulations could discount the value of the collection for deduction purposes, 
depending on the ratio of the endowment to the art. Art experts would need to 
help design the regulations to determine an optimal ratio for the endowment, 
but a possible rule could work as follows. If the ideal endowment is half the 
value of the collection, then a gift with a 2:1 ratio of art to money would get a 
full deduction. If the endowment were only 25% of the art (4:1), the deduction 
might be limited to 50% of the art, and so on.288 Because the money in 
endowments for preservation and care of art are always valuable to recipient 
institutions, the deduction should be allowed in full for gifts of money. Such a 
rule would alert both donors and charities to the long-term liabilities created 
by gifts of art collections. If that rule had been in place, it might have 
prevented some of the foulest fights we have seen in charity law, where cash-
strapped institutions were unable to either monetize their valuable art 
collections or afford to care for them properly.289  
                                                                                                                 
 285 See Colinvaux, supra note 265, at 2 (advocating for cash gifts). 
 286 Id. 
 287 The rules under I.R.C. § 170(e) are analogous. They limit the deduction for donated 
tangible personal property to basis where the property is not related to the recipient’s 
exempt purpose. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B). Publicly traded stock is more easily valued and sold 
than tangible personal property, so it is a better gift for charities to receive. 
 288 Experts would determine the metric for measuring the appropriate endowment. It 
could vary by the type or size of the work, rather than the value. Under alternative metrics, 
the endowment could be larger than the value of the gift, which would signal to charities 
that the property might not be worth accepting. 
 289 See In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, 2004 WL 1960204, at *6 (Pa. C.P. 
Montgomery Cty., Jan. 29, 2004) (deviation proceeding to move priceless collection of art 
to new location); see also In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 584–85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) 
(cy pres proceeding involving the Stieglitz collection at Fisk University). For discussion of 
many cases concerning art, see Sugin, supra note 280, at 560–73. 
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Building naming rights create liabilities that depend on the duration of 
those rights, so the deduction should be sensitive to that duration.290 If we 
were to rely on a strict quid pro quo analysis to limit the deduction for naming 
rights, valuation would be a substantial problem. We can’t get the amount 
precisely right for the diminution in value on account of restrictions. But 
adopting the liability perspective of charities makes the valuation of return 
benefit to the donor less important than it is under current jurisprudence. In its 
place, the law should consider the long-term burden imposed on the charity by 
any obligation, and categorize the gift in a hierarchy of restrictions that limits 
the deduction.291 The Fisher family settlement can give us an idea of how to 
think about the value of restrictions, but the amount of the deduction’s 
reduction is less important than the fact that the law will recognize restrictions 
and treat them as a limitation on the gift that diminishes its social value. Once 
we treat the charitable deduction as an arbiter of social meaning, and not only 
an economic incentive, the precise value of a quid pro quo matters less. The 
Internal Revenue Service clearly has sufficient authority to implement such a 
hierarchy without any statutory change—it is an interpretation of what a “gift” 
is under Internal Revenue Code § 170(c). 
While the details are flexible, a template for naming rights might be 
designed with an expected duration of forty years. The tax law presumes that 
buildings waste over 27.5 to 39 years,292 so that is a reasonable standard to use 
for the presumed duration of building naming rights. After that period, the 
charity will need a new infusion of funds to renovate and upgrade the named 
structure, without even considering other needs that the organization might 
have. Most donors cannot expect to live longer than forty years after their gifts 
(Mark Zuckerberg notwithstanding), and any naming rights that extend beyond 
forty years should be considered both too self-regarding and liability creating 
for charities. Since forty-year naming rights have both benefits and costs, the 
law could give a modest discount for those gifts, compared to cash, say 90% of 
cash value. A discounted deduction would create a clear signal that restrictions 
are costly for charities. Consequently, a forty-year naming gift would be 
allowed a deduction with a 10% discount. That discount would increase as the 
duration of the naming right increases. Since a name in perpetuity imposes 
very substantial costs on a charity, donors should have to relinquish a 
substantial part of their deduction to account for the long-term burden they are 
imposing on the recipient organization. I would propose at least 50%. 
Calibrating the charitable deduction is a good mechanism in this context 
because it changes the price of the restriction, without prohibiting it altogether. 
Donors could still demand perpetuity, and charities could still agree to it. If 
donors really value perpetuity, they can indicate that by accepting a 
diminished deduction. But they will know that perpetuity is disfavored by the 
                                                                                                                 
 290 See supra Part III.C.1. 
 291 See supra Part IV.B. 
 292 That is the recovery period for buildings for depreciation purposes. I.R.C. § 168(c). 
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law and considered exceptional by the charitable community. The diminished 
deduction gives charities the power to resist perpetuity in two ways: by 
appealing to both the donor’s interest in tax benefits and reputation for 
generosity. Because agreements between donors and charities would continue 
to be private, in keeping with the overwhelmingly private character of charities 
and charities law, it is necessary that charities have tools that give them some 
power when they come to the negotiating table.  
The carrots in this proposal are as important as the sticks. The law could 
encourage shorter duration names by granting greater tax benefits for them. 
Short duration names give charities the most benefit because they can be 
resold relatively soon. Because of the extra benefits for charities’ fundraising 
that naming gifts produce, a full deduction should be allowed for cash gifts 
with naming rights that do not exceed twenty years. The law could even 
authorize a deduction bonus for short-lived names.293 A bonus deduction for 
cash gifts with short-duration names might strike some people as oddly 
generous, but it should be evaluated against the current law regime that allows 
full fair market value deductions for gifts of property with built-in untaxed 
appreciation.294 Those deductions already contain a bonus because donors 
need not include any gain in income, but receive a deduction for the full fair 
market value of the donated property.295 A gift with a short-lived name is 
clearly superior to gifts of appreciated property—it encourages others to step 
up quickly both in the same campaign and in the one to follow when the name 
expires. Competitive philanthropy at its best encourages the most giving 
overall. 
Relinquishing a name should also have a tax benefit so that the law 
effectively signals that good. Too much attention to Avery Fisher Hall has 
eclipsed the encouraging competitive philanthropy story of the Allen Room. 
Donors who relinquish restrictions are giving something important to charity 
both by releasing direct burdens and by challenging the philanthropic 
community to support the organization. They should be encouraged. 
                                                                                                                 
 293 Explicit deduction bonuses already exist in the tax law. See I.R.C. § 168(k) (bonus 
depreciation). Credits can operate as implicit bonuses where they provide tax benefits that 
more than offset the tax liability on the income devoted to the creditable expenditure. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. § 25A(i) (education credit makes education cheaper than it would be in the 
absence of taxes). 
 294 See Halperin, supra note 283, at 14–16 (explaining the effect of the law and 
proposing change to mitigate the bonus effect). 
 295 For example, if a taxpayer donates property with a fair market value of $100 and a 
basis of $20, she can deduct $100 under § 170, but does not need to pay tax on the $80 
appreciation built into the stock. If taxpayer gives a $100 cash gift, the deduction 
eliminates the tax that was paid on the earning of the $100; but the gift of property gives 
the taxpayer a better result because the $80 appreciation is deducted without ever having 
been included. This is a well-known quirk in the tax law, and has been critically assessed. 
See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 283, at 319–21 (arguing for repeal of the appreciated 
property rule). 
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There are two ways to think about relinquishment under the charitable 
deduction. One would treat relinquishment as completing the earlier partial 
gift. Under that approach, if a donor with perpetual rights received a 50% 
deduction on the initial gift, a subsequent relinquishment would trigger the 
other 50% of the original value of the gift. An alternative approach to 
relinquishment would determine a deduction for the first donor with reference 
to the subsequent gift. For example, the first donor could receive a new 
deduction equal to the same percentage of the new gift that he was earlier 
denied. So, if the old gift allowed a deduction equal to 80% of the donation, 
the new gift would trigger an additional donation for the first donor equal to 
20% of the new donor’s gift.  
The second rule would give relinquishing donors an incentive to work 
toward raising new gifts that exceed the donor’s own, in keeping with 
competitive philanthropy. If the new donor’s gift exceeds the old donor’s, then 
the old donor gets a bonus because his total deduction is larger than his out of 
pocket cost.296 This should not trouble us because the tax system often allows 
tax benefits that more than compensate taxpayers for prior tax paid on the 
expenditure.297 The point of competitive philanthropy is to encourage past 
donors to prod new ones to top their gifts and to reward them when they 
succeed. Herb Allen was the catalyst for the Appel Room’s new gift, 298 and 
the tax law should recognize that value. 
D. Charities Should Support This Reform 
Charities generally panic at any suggestion that the law change, even when 
the change is clearly to their benefit.299 The proposal here arguably reduces the 
benefits of the charitable deduction, which inevitably causes alarm. However, 
charities should appreciate that this proposal is to their benefit, in both the long 
and short term. The long-term benefit is apparent: charities will be able to sell 
                                                                                                                 
 296 This will not always be true in present value terms. A later, larger deduction might 
not compensate fully for the time value of the earlier deduction’s limitation. For example, 
if a taxpayer makes a $100 million gift in year one and receives a $50 million deduction, a 
deduction ten years later would have to be $67.2 million (at 3%) to be equivalent to the $50 
million deduction foregone earlier. 
 297 Debt-financed investments in depreciable property also give rise to current 
deductions on amounts not previously included in income because borrowing is not taxed. 
See Halperin, supra note 283. 
 298 See Blatter, supra note 8. 
 299 Some charities opposed a proposal to extend the charitable deduction to gifts given 
until April 15, of the year following the tax year, even though the proposal was 
incontrovertibly to their benefit. Eugene Steuerle, An April 15 Deadline for Charitable 
Giving Would Be a Boon to Nonprofits, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Dec. 8, 2014), 
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/An-April-15-Deadline-for/152105 (on file with Ohio 
State Law Journal) (“Nonprofits like the Jewish Federations of North America support the 
option, but some other charities have expressed concern about whether it would harm 
end-of-year appeals.”). 
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their names more often for higher total prices than they have in the past. But in 
the short term, a competitive philanthropy tax regime would also benefit 
charities because it gives them more leverage in negotiating restricted gifts and 
helps them minimize burdensome restrictions. 
Like scholars, charities generally assume the economic framework, so they 
have taken for granted that the monetary value of the tax benefit and the size 
of the direct return benefit are the most important incentives to donors. But the 
research on giving suggests this is not true,300 and at the very top of the wealth 
pyramid, the deductibility limits in § 170 prevent full enjoyment of the 
deduction.301 If charities considered the evidence on the signaling effects of 
charitable gifts302 and the sociological observations about the culture of 
philanthropy among the elite,303 they would understand that that the economic 
incentive in the charitable deduction is only one of many factors that affect 
giving.  
At this moment, charities would be well advised to shift their focus to 
capitalizing on noneconomic incentives for giving because the value of the 
charitable deduction is going down under the new tax law. That legislation 
increases the exemption under the estate tax,304 reducing the economic 
incentive for leaving a bequest to charity; without a larger exemption, 
decedents are able to leave larger estates to their heirs free of tax.305 It also 
reduces the top marginal rate to 37%,306 reducing the government’s economic 
subsidy for charitable giving, relative to the taxpayer’s out-of-pocket cost.307 
The lower the marginal rate of tax, the less economic incentive a deduction 
provides for giving.308 Limitation of the state and local tax deduction,309 along 
with the increased standard deduction in the new law,310 will make itemizing 
                                                                                                                 
 300 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 301 See supra text accompanying note 85. 
 302 See Ariely et al., supra note 57, at 547. 
 303 See OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 6. 
 304 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 11061, § 2010(c)(3), 131 Stat. 
2054, 2091 (2017). 
 305 The estate tax is levied on the value of the decedent’s total estate, with an unlimited 
deduction for the value of bequests to charity out of the estate. See I.R.C. § 2055 (2012). 
 306 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, sec. 11001, § 1. 
 307 At a 40% marginal rate, every dollar of contribution can be understood as paid sixty 
cents by the taxpayer and forty cents by the government. As the rate goes down to 33%, the 
government’s portion is reduced by seven cents.  
 308 While lower marginal rates would reduce the overall tax burden on high-income 
taxpayers, giving them more money to donate to charity, Joseph Cordes, a leading 
nonprofits economist, opined that he believed that the reduction in the subsidy from 
reduced marginal rates would have a larger effect on giving than the reduction in overall 
tax burden. That means the incentive to give less will exceed the countervailing ability to 
give more. Professor Joseph J. Cordes, George Washington University, Address at 
ARNOVA’s 45th Annual Conference: Nonprofits, Philanthropy, and Government: Policy 
and Partnerships in an Era of Change (Nov. 17, 2016). 
 309 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, § 11042. 
 310 Id. § 11021. 
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deductions less common. All of these changes make the charitable deduction 
less economically potent. 
Research on the psychology of gift giving suggests that these reforms to 
the charitable deduction would not reduce giving, so charities may have 
nothing to fear, even if the deduction is curtailed. Empirical studies in 
psychology show that donors give less to charity when they view the 
transaction as an exchange, rather than a pure gift.311 The desire for communal 
participation is in tension with reciprocity, and donations with fewer return 
benefits from charities are more altruistic and praiseworthy to third parties.312 
Consequently, the less a donor receives from both a charity and government, 
via tax subsidy, the more reputational benefit that gift provides. Those studies 
suggest that the charitable deduction may not be nearly as economically 
important as we believe it to be. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When the tax law is not raising revenue, the most important thing it can do 
is shape norms and expectations. The charitable deduction is a revenue loser. 
While it can provide an economic incentive to charitable giving, it can do 
more than that. Modified rules for deducting charitable gifts can begin to 
change the dynamic between donors and charities by reducing the relative 
power of donors and elevating the charitable mission of recipient 
organizations. Better rules can design guidelines for realigning the relationship 
of philanthropists and institutions to the advantage of beneficiaries and the 
public. The tax law should explicitly define the good for high-end giving as 
competitive philanthropy: A successful philanthropist is one who encourages 
others to give even larger gifts.  
Charity law should better account for the importance of philanthropy in 
the culture of the elite. With more money concentrated at the top of the income 
distribution, the tax law needs to be more discriminating among taxpayers with 
means. While rates, deductions, and exclusions in current law should be on the 
table as we grapple with the challenge of increasing inequality and wealth 
concentration, reforming the tax law to effectively collect more tax from the 
top is a daunting task. Scattering some of that wealth out from the richest 
individuals will require inroads on multiple fronts. Because the wealthy have 
myriad opportunities for tax minimization under the law, the charitable 
deduction’s nudge toward redistribution out of the very top is important. And 
since there is so much uncertainty about the deduction’s economic 
consequences, its social function should be better appreciated.  
Charity law has been insufficiently targeted to fostering redistribution 
from the rich. By failing to make distinctions between different types of gifts, 
it encourages and validates gifts with substantial return benefits and limited 
                                                                                                                 
 311 See Weisbord & DeScioli, supra note 94, at 229–30. 
 312 See id. at 274.  
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public advantages. Some restrictions on gifts should be understood as long-
term liabilities imposed on charities. The deduction allowed to donors should 
reflect the balance of benefits and burdens. Naming rights are good for 
charities, but only if they are not granted in perpetuity and only if they help 
charities to raise further gifts. Rules encouraging and celebrating competitive 
philanthropy, like the one proposed in this Article, which includes both carrots 
and sticks, would be a welcome addition to the law. 
